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INTRODUCTION

[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens
the full protections of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often'
extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which has brought
federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law-for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.
William J. Brennan, Jr.'
In 1990, on the twentieth anniversary of the call that led to
the 1972 Montana Constitution, the voters of Montana will have
the opportunity to call for another constitutional convention.2
With this decision facing the people, the time has come to take a
1. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 489, 491 (1977) [hereinafter Protection]. Mr. Brennan is an Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court.
2. See MONT. CONST. art. XIV § 3; see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-1-121 (1989).
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look at the 1972 Montana Constitution to see how well it has
served us.
A state constitution ought to do two things. First, it should
provide a bulwark for the protection of the people from the government or, as the late Justice William 0. Douglas said, it should
"keep the government off the backs of the people." 3 Second, it
should provide a structure for the functioning of the government
to enable the people to govern themselves in an efficient, orderly,
and fair way. Such a structure should be responsive to the will of
the people, while providing the right measure of principled protection for those governmental objectives and institutions which we
believe should be beyond regular politics. In addition to the objectives of limiting governmental power and providing a structure for
the functioning of government, a state constitution may provide a
statement of goals which a government should strive to achieve.4
This article focuses on the unique features of the 1972 Montana Constitution.' The features are unique either because the
Montana constitutional provisions have no counterpart in the federal constitution, or because the Montana courts have chosen to
interpret certain provisions of Montana's constitution independently. This article will first discuss the proper role of a state constitution in the federal system. Second, this article will approach
the 1972 Constitution through examination of two general categories: the protection of individual rights and the structure and orderly functioning of the government. The constitutional provisions designed to protect individual rights are found largely in
article II of the Montana Constitution, and the provisions for the
structure and functioning of government are found in the remaining articles.7 Examining the case law pertaining to these provisions
should provide some guidance in evaluating how effective the Montana courts have been in interpreting Montana's constitution.
3.

Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 28 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

4. For example, art. X § 1(1) of the MONTANA CONSTITUTION states: "It is the goal of
the people to establish a system of education which will develop the full educational potential of each person."
5. Because of this focus, broad areas of Montana constitutional law will not be
addressed.
6. The dichotomy is not completely exclusive. For example, the education article (art.
X), which is mainly a structural provision, contains a guarantee of equality of educational
opportunity to all persons, a provision that might be found more naturally in the declaration of rights.
7.

MONT. CONST. arts.

III to XIV.
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THE FUNCTION OF A STATE CONSTITUTION IN OUR FEDERAL
SYSTEM

Prior to discussing particular provisions of the Montana Constitution, we need a sense of the proper role of a state constitution
in our federal system. The framers of the United States Constitution sought to achieve a balance between state and federal power
by limiting the power of the federal government to those powers
delegated and enumerated in the federal constitution, and by reserving to the states "police power" or the inherent and implied
powers necessary to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of
their people.8 It is well established that the United States Constitution is "the supreme law of the land," and that a state may not
contravene federal constitutional provisions.10 Moreover, a state
may not exercise its power in any way that interferes with the federal government's exercise of its constitutional powers.'1 Aside
from these limitations, the question of how a state provides for its
operations is a matter for the state to decide, free from federal
constraints. Thus, establishing a system of public education and
protecting and managing public resources, for example, are matters
left largely to the sovereign powers of the states.
The main provision by which the United States Supreme
Court has adjusted rights of the states vis-a-vis the federal government is the "commerce clause," found in article I, section 8, clause
3, of the United States Constitution.' 2 The commerce clause as judicially construed provides a broad doctrinal basis for extension of
federal power and significant extensions of federal power based on
that clause have occurred.1 3 Interpretations under that clause have
allowed the federal government to intrude significantly into what
many would argue are the internal affairs of the states." Because
8. See U.S. CONST. amends. IX and X; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG,

CONSTITU-

111, 113 (3d ed. (1986)) [hereinafter NOWAK].
9. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819).
10. For example, a state may not maintain a malapportioned legislature in violation of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
11. See e.g. Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983) (state regulatory authority preempted when the federal government intends to occupy a field or when the state regulation conflicts with federal
law).
12. The commerce clause reads: "The Congress shall have power ... [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl.3.
13. See NOWAK, supra note 8,at 123-294.
14. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (in which the
Court held that the commerce clause permitted Congress to impose minimum-wage and
TIONAL LAW
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state sovereignty can be divested by federal exercises of power
under the commerce clause (and under other constitutional grants
of power), state power within the federal system lies predominantly in the ability to influence the federal government through
election of representatives, senators, and the president. 5
Montana's constitution contains several provisions which, although similar in form and function to those found in the federal
constitution, are nevertheless a matter of state law. Like the federal constitution, the Montana Constitution provides for three
branches of government and a system of checks and balances intended to inhibit the investment of tyrannical power in any single
branch of government. 6 The Montana Constitution also provides
for free popular elections, initiatives, and referenda, which are
designed to make government responsive to the will of the people.1 7 Finally, the protection of individual rights is accomplished
largely through article II of the Montana Constitution, the "Declaration of Rights," which is Montana's counterpart to the federal
Bill of Rights.
Although states may not contravene the federal constitution,
they may interpret, and increasingly are interpreting their own
constitutions to provide more stringent protections of individual
rights.1 8 The Bill of Rights provides a threshold level of protection,
overtime regulations on state and local governments).
15. Id. at 551. "Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers, the principal means chosen by the Framers to
ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself." Id. at 550. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 186 n.54 (2d. ed.
1988) [hereinafter TRIBE].
The political system has been unsuccessful, however, in maintaining an appropriate balance between the states and the central government in their ability to finance their operations. Unconscionable federal taxes to finance numerous dubious governmental projects
have left the states almost bankrupt to finance fundamental and constitutionally mandated
services such as quality public education and the right to a subsistence living. Examples
include the "Star Wars" defense project and the photograph called "Piss Christ" (showing a
"plastic crucifix submerged in the artist's urine") financed through the National Endowment for the Arts. See NEWSWEEK, August 7, 1989, at 23. Further, the National Institute of
Neurological and Communicative Disorders and Stroke received Senator Proxmire's
"Golden Fleece" award for 'tossing away $160,000 to study in part whether someone can
"hex an opponent during a strength test by drawing an X on the opponent's chest.' "The
Institute felt the study would aid research into neurological disorders." See BARRON'S, January 13, 1986, at 3.
16. See MONT. CONST. art. III § 1 (separation of powers), art. V (the legislature), art.
VI (the executive), and art. VII (the judiciary).
17. See MONT. CONST. art. III (general government), art. IV (suffrage and elections),
art. XIV § 8 (constitutional amendment by referendum), and art. XIV § 9 (constitutional
amendment by initiative).
18. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982); see also Brennan, Protection, supra note 1.
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below which states are not free to go. The historical evolution of
this development has been thoroughly treated elsewhere and need
not be reiterated here. 9 Suffice it to say that prior to the Civil
War, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the Bill of
Rights to protect citizens only against the federal government, and
not against state governments."0 Thus, citizens seeking free speech,
due process, and other fundamental protections against state governments had to look to their own state constitutions. 2 '
The fourteenth amendment was adopted in 1868 and a half
century later there began a gradual "selective incorporation" of the
protections of the federal Bill of Rights into the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. By the end of the Warren era in
the late 1960s, the Court had applied virtually all of the Bill of
Rights protections to state governments." Associate Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. commented that the process of selective incorporation "transformed the basic structure of constitutional safeguards for individual political and civil liberties in the nation and
profoundly altered the character of our federal system:""
The agenda of the national Court was radically altered by the nationalization of the first eight amendments. Only rarely in the
nineteenth century did individuals challenge the exercise of federal authority. Now modern constitutional law revolves around
questions of civil and political liberty. The Court's reinvigorated
construction of the fourteenth amendment, and particularly the
nationalization of the Bill of Rights through the due
process
25
clause, are the primary reasons for that development.
While the incorporation of most of the Bill of Rights into the
fourteenth amendment brought civil and political rights to the
fore, it also "obscured the functional independence of the original
state ... guarantees. 21 6 However, "the Supreme Court's haphazard
retreat from political activism" during the 1970s has "sparked renewed interest in, and renewed controversy over, state bills of
19. See generally Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986) [hereinafter
Revival]; Brennan, Protection,supra note 1; Developments in the Law: The Interpretation
of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324 (1982) [hereinafter Developments];
Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-The Montana Disaster, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1095
(1985) [hereinafter Collins].
20. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
21. Brennan, Protection,supra note 1, at 502; Developments, supra note 19, at 1328.
22. See Brennan, Revival, supra note 19, at 541-45.
23. See id. at 541.
24. Id. at 545.
25. Id.
26. Developments, supra note 19, at 1328.
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rights. '2 7 Some states have adopted constitutional provisions that
are more protective of individual liberty than the federal Bill of
Rights. Montana, for example, has explicitly guaranteed protection
of individual privacy 2s and the rights of citizens to observe deliberations of government.2 9 Because these are separate and independent provisions, state courts should interpret them free from the
constraint of federal interpretations of the United States Constitution. Even when there are state constitutional provisions which are
virtually identical counterparts to the federal Bill of Rights, such
as guarantees of free speech and freedom of religion, states are free
to interpret their own provisions in a manner more protective of
individual liberty than the federal courts interpret the federal constitution.3 0 As one Montana Supreme Court justice said recently,
the United States Supreme Court is not "the sole repository of judicial wisdom and rationality." 1
It is fundamental that if a state court decision rests on independent and adequate state grounds, the United States Supreme
Court will not interfere with it.3 2 However, given the pervasive influence of federal constitutional law, it is not always clear whether
constitutional decisions are based on state or federal grounds.
Prior to the Court's decision in Michigan v. Long,33 "many people
believed that, if a state court had relied on both state and federal
law, the Supreme Court would presume that the state ground was
independent."' 34 Michigan v. Long disabused that presumption.
There, the Court pronounced:
[W]hen, as in this case, a state court decision fairly appears to
rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal
law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible
state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will
accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law
required it to do so. If a state court chooses merely to rely on
27. See id.
28. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
29. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9.
30. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983).
31. State v. Jackson (Jackson II), 206 Mont. 338, 357, 672 P.2d 255, 264 (1983) (Shea,
J., dissenting).
32. Long, 463 U.S. at 1041-42; see also Elison and NettikSimmons, Federalism and
State Constitutions: The New Doctrine of Independent and Adequate State Grounds, 45
MONT. L. REV. 177 (1984).
33. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
34. Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the
Relationship Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEX. L. REV. 977, 981 (1985); Brennan,
Protection, supra note 1, at 501.
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federal precedents as it would on the precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear by a plain statement in its
judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only for
the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result
that the court has reached. s5
State v. Jackson3 6 (Jackson II) offers a poignant example of
the ambivalence between state and federal grounds in constitutional decision making and a missed opportunity by the state of
Montana to assert an independent interpretation of its own constitution. The decision has been roundly criticized by Professor Collins in his article, Reliance on State Constitutions- The Montana
Disaster.-7 Originally, in Jackson 1,38 the Montana Supreme Court
affirmed an order in limine of the district court precluding the
state from introducing evidence of a DUI defendant's refusal to
take a breathalizer test.3 9 Montana law provided that if a defendant refused to take a sobriety test, evidence of that refusal would
be introduced at the defendant's trial.' 0 Jackson argued that the
statute infringed on his right to remain silent and his right to due
process of law.' 1 Both rights are guaranteed by the United States
and Montana Constitutions.2
The state of Montana petitioned for certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court, arguing that the decision in Jackson I was
so "interwoven" with and "dependent" upon federal law as to allow the Court to assume jurisdiction.' 3 While the Jackson petition
was pending in the United States Supreme Court, the Court accepted a similar petition in South Dakota v. Neville"' and determined that no federal constitutional violation resulted from introducing evidence of a defendant's refusal to take a sobriety test.' 5
The United States Supreme Court sat on the Jackson petition for
thirteen months and then granted the petition for certiorari after
deciding Neville, stating in a per curiam decision:
[The] judgment [is] vacated, and [the] case [is] remanded to
35. Long, 463 U.S. at 1041-42; see Pollock, supra note 34, at 981.
36. 206 Mont. 338, 672 P.2d 253 (1983) [hereinafter Jackson II].
37. 63 TEx. L. REV. 1095 (1985).
38. 195 Mont. 185, 637 P.2d 1 (1981), vacated, 460 U.S. 1030, rev'd, 206 Mont. 338,
672 P.2d 255 (1983) [hereinafter Jackson I].
39. Jackson 1, 195 Mont. at 193, 637 P.2d at 5.
40. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-404(2) (1981).
41. Jackson I, 195 Mont. at 187, 191, 637 P.2d at 2, 4.
42. See U.S. CONST. amend. V and MONT. CONST. art. II, §§ 17, 25.
43. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Montana v. Jackson, 460 U.S. 1030 (1983).
44. 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
45. As in Jackson, the defendant in Neville had relied on both federal and state constitutional grounds. See Neville, 459 U.S. at 556 n.5.
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the Supreme Court of Montana to consider whether its judgment
is based upon federal or state constitutional grounds, or both....
and, if its judgment is not based upon state constitutional
grounds, for further consideration in light of South Dakota v.
Neville."'
Justice Stevens, who later dissented in Michigan v. Long,4 7 took
exception to the per curiam decision, finding that the judgment of
the Montana Supreme Court rested on adequate and independent
state grounds, because the Montana Supreme Court had based its
decision on the Montana Constitution.4 8
On the remand to the Montana Supreme Court, the majority,
in a decision by Chief Justice Haswell, reversed itself, holding that
the state right against self-incrimination is governed by federal
constitutional standards. 9 Justice Haswell, relying on State v. Finley,50 declared: "The language used in the two constitutions is substantially identical and affords no basis for interpreting Montana's
prohibition against self-incrimination more broadly than its federal
counterpart."5 1
Justice Shea, joined by Justice Sheehy in his dissent, criticized
the majority for "abdicating" the Montana Supreme Court's responsibility to interpret the Montana Constitution:
In the guise of compliance with the mandate of the United States
Supreme Court's order of remand vacating our judgment, the majority has simply rewritten Jackson to comport with its own views
as to interpreting our state constitution. In doing so, the majority
has delegated to the United States Supreme Court our duty to
interpret our constitution. This constitutes an abdication of our
duty to interpret our own constitution.2
Professor Collins also decried the majority opinion in Jackson
II, asserting that linking the Montana Constitution to United
States Supreme Court decisions on the fifth amendment
"stripp[ed] the state self-incrimination guarantee of any independent force:" ' 3
Finley and Jackson II essentially render Montana's self-incrimi46.
47.

460 U.S. 1030 (1983) (citations omitted); see Collins, supra note 19, at 1105.
463 U.S. at 1065.

48. Montana, 460 U.S. at 1031-32, 1033.
49. Jackson 11, 206 Mont. at 348, 672 P.2d at 260.
50.
51.
52.
1110.
53.

173 Mont. 162, 566 P.2d 1119 (1977).
Jackson 11, 206 Mont. at 348, 672 P.2d at 260.
Id. at 352, 672 P.2d at 262 (Shea, J., dissenting); see Collins, supra note 19, at
Collins, supra note 19, at 1115.
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nation clause nugatory. Chief Justice Haswell's majority opinion
withdraws from all state judges the legal authority to make independent judgments about the constitutional contours of article II,
section 25. In all cases involving the self-incrimination guarantee,
state judges must now divine the meaning of federal law, no matter how ambiguous or unsettled, and thereafter proclaim that to
be the supreme law of the state of Montana. 4
Fortunately, there are exceptions in Montana to the approach
followed in Jackson II. The Montana courts have departed from
overly restrictive federal decisions when interpreting several important individual rights provisions found in the Montana Constitution. The next section of this article examines the Montana Supreme Court's treatment of those provisions, focusing on
guarantees which have no counterpart in the federal constitution,
or which the court, unlike in Jackson II, has chosen to interpret
independently.
III.

MONTANA'S APPROACH TO INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS UNDER THE

1972
A.

CONSTITUTION

The Early Cases-Use of the Federal Strict Scrutiny and
Rational Basis Models
1. Individual Dignity

Article II, section 4 of the Montana Constitution, the "individual dignity" clause, reads as follows:
The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any
person, firm, corporation, or institution shall discriminate against
any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights on account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas.
To some extent there is a federal counterpart to this provision.
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment declares
that no state shall deny a person "the equal protection of the
laws." Because we are so influenced by the United States Constitution, it is easy to approach article II, section 4 as just another
equal protection clause and, once having made that assumption, to
apply mechanically the federal equal protection analysis. Indeed,
the Montana Supreme Court did just that in State v. Craig.5
54. Id.
55. 169 Mont. 150, 545 P.2d 649 (1976). See Comment, The Montana Constitution:
Taking Rights Seriously-IH. Equal Rights, 39 MONT. L. REV. 221, 240-41 (1978) (authored
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In Craig a male criminal defendant challenged a statutory sex
classification which provided: "a male person who knowingly has
sexual intercourse without consent with a female . .. commits the
offense of sexual intercourse without consent."5 The court rejected
the constitutional challenge. Applying the rational basis test, the
court held that the statute did not "arbitrarily" classify on the basis of sex, because "historically such attacks have been by men
upon women. ' 5 7 Because Montana's individual dignity clause explicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, the court
should have subjected the statute to an analysis more demanding
than the federal rational basis test. Instead, however, the Montana
Supreme Court interpreted Montana's individual dignity clause as
"coextensive with the federal equal protection clause," thereby
making Montana's provision constitutionally superfluous.5 8
In fact, the state and federal provisions diverge in several important respects. First, Montana's provision, unlike the federal
fourteenth amendment, is not limited to "state action." It applies
to infringements on individual rights not only by the state, but
also by private persons or institutions. "By prohibiting discrimination by 'any person, firm, corporation, or institution,'5 9 Montana
enacted the most expansive equal rights provision in the nation." 60
To date there has been no decision of the Montana Supreme
Court interpreting the private action provision of Montana's individual dignity clause. However, the Montana Supreme Court had
the opportunity to apply the private action provision in In re Will
of Cram.6 1 In Cram, the plaintiffs challenged the provision of a will
that devised funds to FFA and 4-H Club members for sheep-raising projects, because the will provided that the funds could be distributed only to male members.6 2 The plaintiffs, female FFA and
4-H Club members, argued that this provision of the will violated
6 3
Montana's explicit prohibition against private discrimination.
by Jeanne M. Koester) [hereinafter Koester].
56. Craig, 169 Mont. at 155, 545 P.2d at 652; REVISED CODES OF MONTANA § 94-5-503
(1947) (emphasis added) [hereinafter REV. CODES MONT.].
57. Id. at 156-57, 545 P.2d at 653 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)); see
also Koester, supra note 55, at 243.
58. See Koester, supra note 55, at 243.
59. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
60. See Koester, supra note 55, at 239. Koester points out that the Montana Constitutional Convention overwhelmingly defeated a proposed amendment to exclude private action from the scope of article II, § 4, demonstrating strong convention support for the eradication of private as well as public discrimination. Id.
61. 186 Mont. 37, 606 P.2d 145 (1980).
62. Id. at 39, 606 P.2d at 147.
63. See Comment, Untouched Protection from Discrimination: Private Action in
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The court apparently ignored this argument in reaching its decision, as though Montana's individual dignity clause were identical
to the federal provision. The clear text of the provision, however,
leaves no doubt that it applies to private action, thereby significantly transcending the federal equal protection clause. It also
raises questions about how literal the interpretation of the provision should be. For example, may a republican governor discriminate against democrats in the selection of her cabinet officers? May
the catholic church prefer catholics in its hiring of teachers for its
parochial schools?"4
A second divergence between the federal and Montana's equal
protection provision is the language in the Montana provision
which forbids discrimination "against any person in the exercise of
his civil or political rights on account of race, color, sex, culture,
social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas."6 5 Presumably, because this explicit language is in addition to the equal protection guarantee, the intent was to provide greater protection
against discrimination than traditionally provided under the federal equal protection analysis. One author, Jeanne Koester, has argued that the "equal rights" provision of Montana's individual dignity clause compels "a standard of review which would assign a
weight to the Montana equal rights provision more appropriate to
its status and history." 6 "This standard-the equal rights standard-is completely distinct from traditional equal protection
standards. The legislative history of the proposed federal equal
rights amendment most clearly articulates this standard."6 7 An
equal rights standard of review would be similar to the "strict scrutiny" test,68 except that the prohibition against discrimination
could not be compromised by social policy considerations.6 9
Despite the individual dignity clause's explicit application to
private action and its prohibition of discrimination beyond "equal
protection" of the laws, the Montana Supreme Court has done little with these provisions. Instead, the court has focused almost
solely on the equal protection provision, just as it did in State v.
Montana's Individual Dignity Clause, infra this issue, text accompanying note 63 (authored
by Tia Rikel Robbin) [hereinafter Robbin].
64. The answers to these questions may also depend on whether the individual right
infringed qualifies as a "civil or political right" under art. II, § 4. See Robbin, supra note 63,
text accompanying notes 27-28.
65. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
66. Koester, supra note 55, at 240, 245-48.
67. Id. at 240.
68. See infra, text accompanying notes 71 to 74.
69. Koester, supra note 55, at 246, 247.
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Craig.

2.

Equal Protection

In the first fourteen years following the adoption of the 1972
Montana Constitution, the Montana Supreme Court generally applied the fourteenth amendment equal protection analysis to
claims brought under Montana's equal protection clause. The federal model is a "two-tier" approach to judicial scrutiny of legislative classifications. 1 "Strict" or "heightened" scrutiny is applied to
those classifications of individuals which are constitutionally "suspect,"' or those which burden a fundamental right.73 If strict scrutiny is invoked, courts will find that the legislative classification
violates the constitution, unless there is a compelling state interest
making the classification necessary. When no fundamental right
or suspect classification is involved, the federal courts engage in
"minimal" or "rational basis" scrutiny.7 5 Under such scrutiny,
every reasonable presumption of constitutionality is indulged and
the classification is generally upheld if the court can conceive of
76
any rational basis to support it.
Although the Montana Supreme Court followed the two-tier
model when analyzing claims brought under Montana's equal protection clause, in actuality, the court applied a rational basis test
more stringent than that applied by the United States Supreme
7
Court. In Oberg v. City of Billings,
for example, a police officer
70. Note, however, that Justice Shea's opinion in Oberg v. City of Billings, 207 Mont.
277, 674 P.2d 494 (1983), went beyond the strict equal protection language:
[O]ur state constitution provides for the protection of every citizen's "individual
dignity." It cannot be doubted that subjecting one to a lie detector test is an affront to one's dignity and unless strictly structured can be an invasion of privacy.
Id. at 285, 674 P.2d at 497-98.
71. See Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrineon a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1,
8 (1972) [hereinafter Gunther]. In Professor Gunther's formulation, "the Warren Court embraced a rigid two-tier attitude. Some situations evoked the aggressive 'new' equal protection, with scrutiny that was 'strict' in theory and 'fatal' in fact; in other contexts, the deferential 'old' equal protection reigned, with minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in
fact." Id.
72. E.g. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (race).
73. E.g. G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404 (1982) (right to vote); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (right to travel).
74. TRIBE, supra note 15, at 1454.
75. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
76. Id.
77. 207 Mont. 277, 674 P.2d 494 (1983). Note that the Montana Supreme Court appropriately followed the two-tier federal model in State v. Turk, 197 Mont. 311, 643 P.2d 224
(1982), because the defendant based his claims solely on the UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
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challenged a statute which prohibited firms, persons, and business
agencies from requiring submission to lie detector tests as a condition to employment, but exempted "public law enforcement agencies" from the prohibition."8 Oberg alleged, in part, that the statute violated his right of privacy and his right to equal protection of
the laws.79 The court based its decision entirely on the Montana
Constitution's equal protection clause. 0 Following the federal
model, the supreme court first inquired whether the strict scrutiny
test should apply.8 1 The court noted, "Examples of fundamental
rights include privacy, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, right
to vote and right to interstate travel. Examples of suspect criteria
are wealth, race, nationality and alienage. '"82 The court held that
the plaintiff's "mere allegation" that the polygraph test violated
his right to privacy was insufficient to show that the statute substantially abridged a fundamental right.8 3 Thus, the court declined
to apply the strict scrutiny test.
The court nevertheless struck down the statute. Applying the
rational basis test, the court found that the statute failed to meet
even that test.8 ' Although lip service was given to the federal
model, the test actually applied had more teeth than the federal
test. Central to the reasoning of the Oberg court was the legislature's failure to articulate an express purpose for the classification:
This Court cannot determine whether this classification bears a
rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose because there is no expressed purpose for the classification on the
face of the statute or in the statute's legislative history. For that
reason, the challenged part of the statute is overbroad and vague
on its face, and an unconstitutional violation of the plaintiff's
right to equal protection of the law.8 5
This is a much more searching scrutiny than that ordinarily employed by the United States Supreme Court under the rational basis test. In applying the rational basis requirement, the Court has
generally been willing to uphold any classification based on cirId. at 314, 643 P.2d at 226.
78. Oberg, 207 Mont. at 280, 674 P.2d at 495 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304(1)
(1983)).
79. Id. at 278, 674 P.2d at 494.
80. Id. at 280, 674 P.2d at 495.
81. See id. at 280-81, 674 P.2d at 495-96.
82. Id. at 280, 674 P.2d at 495.
83. Id. The trial court had invalidated the exemption using a strict scrutiny analysis
based on its determination that the right of privacy was involved. Id.
84. Id. 207 Mont. at 281, 674 P.2d at 496.
85. Id.
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cumstances that "reasonably can be conceived to constitute a distinction, or difference in state policy ....
Although there was a wide divergence of opinion in the Oberg
decision, all of the justices followed the federal two-tier model.
Justice Morrison contended that the strict scrutiny test, rather
than the rational basis test, should apply because the classification
burdened the plaintiff's right to privacy. 7 Chief Justice Haswell
approved of using the rational basis test, but disagreed with the
majority's opinion that a rational relationship had not been
demonstrated.

8

He asserted that Montana's constitutional provi-

sion should not be extended beyond its federal counterpart:
This Court has recognized that "[tihe similar provisions of the
equal protection clauses of the United States and Montana Constitutions provide generally equivalent but independent protection in their respective jurisdictions." No basis can be found in
the proceedings of the Montana Constitutional Convention to indicate an intention to treat our equal protection guarantee any
differently than its counterpart in the United States Constitution.
One who attacks a statute as violating equal protection has the
burden of proving that the classification is arbitrary. Officer
Oberg has failed to do so."
The Montana Supreme Court also followed the two-tier federal model in an equal protection case dealing with residence requirements for outfitters9 0 In Godfrey v. Montana Fish & Game
Commission,91 the Montana Supreme Court found that a residency
requirement for an outfitter's license was not a classification burdening a fundamental right and, therefore, did not apply the strict
scrutiny test.92 As in Oberg, however, the court applied a rational
basis test with teeth and found that the classification lacked a ra86. Allied Stores Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959). Professor Tribe has characterized this as the "conceivable basis test":
This remarkable deference to state objectives has operated in the sphere of economic regulation quite apart from whether the conceivable "state of facts" (1)
actually exists, (2) would convincingly justify the classification if it did exist, or (3)
was ever been urged in the classification's defense by those who promulgated it or
by those who argued in its support. Often only the Court's imagination has limited
the allowable purposes ascribed to government.
TRIB, supra note 15, at 1443.
87. Oberg, 207 Mont. at 286, 674 P.2d at 498 (Morrison, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 288, 674 P.2d at 499 (Haswell, J., dissenting).
89. Id. (quoting Emery v. State, 177 Mont. 73, 79, 580 P.2d 445, 449, cert. denied, 439
U.S. 874 (1978) (citations omitted)).
90. Godfrey v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, Mont. -, 631 P.2d 1265 (1981).
91.
92.

Mont. -, 631 P.2d 1265 (1981).
Id. at -,
631 P.2d at 1267.
-
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tional relationship to the purpose of the statute.9 3
The use of the federal rational basis test to invalidate legislative classifications in Oberg and Godfrey set the stage for the
"middle-tier" scrutiny that followed. The Montana Supreme
Court's observation in Godfrey portended this "middle-tier"
approach:
Although not fundamental, the ability of appellant to practice his
profession across state lines is, nevertheless, an important right.
When he is denied that right solely because of his membership in
a class of nonresidents, that classification must be reviewed to determine if it bears some
reasonable relationship to legitimate gov9
ernmental interest. '
B.

The Modern Era-The Adoption of Middle-Tier Scrutiny
1.

Welfare Benefits

In 1985, the Montana Legislature enacted provisions which
eliminated general assistance payments to able-bodied individuals
under the age of thirty-five who had no minor dependent children,
and substantially reduced those payments to able-bodied individuals between thirty-five and fifty years of age having no minor dependent children. 95 The Butte Community Union challenged those
provisions, arguing that they denied individuals affected by the
statute the equal protection of the laws.9 6 The Union also argued
that the provisions contravened article XII, section 3(3) of the
Montana Constitution, "the public assistance clause," which then
provided: "The legislature shall provide such economic assistance
and social and rehabilitative services as may be necessary for those
inhabitants who, by reason of age, infirmities, or misfortune may
'97
have the need for the aid of society.
The district court found that the public assistance clause established a fundamental right to welfare "for those who, by reason
93.

Id. at

-,

631 P.2d at 1268.

94. Id. at -, 631 P.2d. at 1267 (emphasis added). Compare this language to the following language in Butte Community Union v. Lewis (Butte Community Union 1), 219
Mont. 426, 712 P.2d 1309 (1986), in which the court adopted "middle-tier" scrutiny:
[A]lthough a right to welfare is not contained in our Declaration of Rights, it is
sufficiently important that art. XII, sec. 3(3) directs the legislature to provide necessary assistance to the misfortunate. A benefit lodged in our State Constitution is
an interest whose abridgement requires something more than a rational relationship to a governmental objective.
Id. at 434, 712 P.2d at 1313.
95. Id. at 428, 712 P.2d at 1310 (1986); see MoNT. CODE ANN. § 53-3-205 (1985).
96. Butte Community Union I, 219 Mont. at 428, 712 P.2d at 1310.
97. Id. at 429, 712 P.2d at 1311.
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of age, infirmities, or misfortune may have the need for the aid of
society."9 8 The district court further held that the Act probably
established an impermissible, discriminatory classification which
violated the equal protection clause. 99 The Montana Supreme
Court affirmed based on violation of the equal protection clause,
but explicitly held that "the Montana Constitution did not establish a fundamental right to welfare for the aged, infirm or misfortunate."' 100 The court in Butte Community Union 1101 reasoned:
"In order to be fundamental, a right must be found within Montana's Declaration of Rights or be a right 'without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little meaning.' Welfare
is neither."' 2
Once having determined that the right to welfare was not a
fundamental right within the meaning of the equal protection
analysis, the court proceeded to express dissatisfaction with the
rigid, two-tier equal protection analysis traditionally applied by
the United States Supreme Court in equal protection cases. The
court reviewed the work of several constitutional scholars who advocated adopting a "middle-tier" approach to equal protection
analysis. 10 3 In addition, the court noted that the Supreme Court
had de facto applied variations of the middle-tier test in cases involving illegitimate children, mandatory retirement for police officers, and gender discrimination.' " Although "the United States
Supreme Court [had] consistently refused to apply this middle
area of review to welfare and other social economic cases,'
the
court, Justice Morrison writing for the majority, observed:
This Court need not blindly follow the United States Supreme
Court when deciding whether a Montana statute is constitutional
pursuant to the Montana Constitution .... We will not be bound
by decisions of the United States Supreme Court where indepen98. Id. at 429, 712 P.2d at 1310 (quoting MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 3(3)).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 429-30, 712 P.2d at 1311. The court relied on the official committee comment to art. II, § 3 which states: 'The intent of the committee on this point is not to create a
substantive right for all the necessities of life to be provided by the public treasury.' Id. at
430-31, 712 P.2d at 1312 (quoting II MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS at
627 (1972) [hereinafter TRANSCRIPTS]).
101. 219 Mont. 426, 712 P.2d 1309 (1986).
102. Id. at 430, 712 P.2d at 1311 (quoting In the Matter of C.H., 210 Mont. 184, 201,
683 P.2d 931, 940 (1984) (citations omitted)).
103. See Gunther, supra note 71, at 17-20; Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Re-

view Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited,Neutral, and Permissible Classifications, 62 GEO. L. J. 1071, 1082 (1974).
104. Butte Community Union I, 219 Mont. at 431, 712 P.2d at 1312.
105. Id.
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dent state grounds exist for developing heightened and expanded
rights under our state constitution. 0 6
The court then proceeded to develop its own middle-tier test
for determining violations of the public assistance clause. It reasoned that, although the right to public assistance is not contained
in the Declaration of Rights, it nevertheless directs the legislature
to "provide necessary assistance to the misfortunate.' ' 10 7 The court
thus held, "A benefit lodged in our State Constitution is an interest whose abridgement requires something more than a rational relationship to a governmental objective."' 10 8 Applying this principle
to the public assistance clause, the court held that any classification of welfare recipients would pass constitutional scrutiny only if
the state proved that the classification is reasonable and the state's
"interest in classifying welfare recipients . . . is more important
than the people's interest in obtaining welfare benefits."10 9 This
middle-tier approach was to become important in the area of educational opportunity after Butte Community Union I.
2.

Equality of Educational Opportunity

Although middle-tier scrutiny arose in the context of welfare
benefits, it was applied again in the context of educational rights.
After the 1985 legislative session, a group of Montana school districts filed an action challenging Montana's system of financing its
public schools. While the school funding case was in the pre-trial
stages, State ex rel. Bartmess v. Board of Trustees of School District No. 1,110 a case which promised to give some guidance to the
to the nature of the right to education in the equal protection context, reached the Montana Supreme Court. The Bartmess case involved a challenge to the requirement of the Helena School Districts that its students maintain a minimum grade point average of
2.0 to participate in extracurricular activities."' Relying on the ed106. Id. at 433, 712 P.2d at 1313.
107. Id. at 434, 712 P.2d at 1313.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 434, 712 P.2d at 1314. Justices Sheehy and Hunt concurred, stating that
they did not wish to be bound by the statement in the majority opinion that fundamental
rights under the Montana Constitution must be found within the declaration of rights (article II). Id. at 435, 712 P.2d at 1314. As Justice Sheehy noted, article II, section 34 "holds
itself open to unenumerated rights which may not be denied to the people." Id. (Sheehy, J.,
concurring). Justice Gulbrandson and Chief Justice Turnage concurred, but disagreed with
the adoption of the middle-tier standard of review, arguing that the legislation at issue did
not meet the existing rational basis test. Id. at 435-36, 712 P.2d at 1314-15.
110. 223 Mont. 269, 726 P.2d 801 (1986).
111. For a detailed discussion of Bartmess, see Comment, Classroom v. Courtroom: Is
the Right to Education Fundamental?, infra this issue (authored by Lori Anne Harper).
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ucation article (article X), the plaintiffs argued that education is a
fundamental right and that, therefore, the court should strictly
scrutinize the grade point classification." 2 The court, however, declined to characterize the case as one involving the "right to education" as a whole, and instead focused on the nature of the interest
in participating in extracurricular activities." 3 The court noted
that, although participation in extracurricular activities is not a
fundamental right under the United States Constitution, that does
not preclude a finding that the right is fundamental under Montana's Constitution."" In reviewing the education provisions of the
Montana Constitution, the court stated:
[T]he educational provisions of the Montana Constitution demonstrates the extreme importance attached to the various elements of education by the people of Montana in adopting the
Constitution. This review suggests that the various aspects of education under our Montana Constitution could be classed as
"fundamental" because of the critical importance of developing
5
the full educational potential of each citizen."
The court stopped short, however, of holding that the right of participation in extracurricular activities was fundamental." 6
The court then discussed the equal protection standard of review, noting that "competing and in some cases contradictory
viewpoints" exist, which "must be considered in determining
whether the educational aspects of extracurricular activities are a
right under our Constitution.11 7 The court concluded that "the
only standard of constitutional review which allows a careful balancing of these competing interests is middle-tier analysis" as
adopted in Butte Community Union . " 8 Applying middle-tier
scrutiny, the court affirmed Helena's minimum grade point
requirement.' 9
While Bartmess focused on the nature of the interest in extracurricular activities and failed to reach a conclusion as to whether
the right to education itself is "fundamental" for equal protection
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
examined
was more
Id.
119.

Bartmess, 223 Mont. at 272, 726 P.2d at 802.
Id.
Id. at 272, 726 P.2d at 803.
Id. at 274, 726 P.2d at 804.
Id. at 275, 726 P.2d at 805.
Id. at 275, 726 P.2d at 804.
Id. The court first inquired whether the classification was reasonable, and then
whether the government's interest in making the classification based on grades
important than the students' interest in participating in extracurricular activities.
Id. at 276, 726 P.2d at 805.
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analysis, dicta in the opinion strongly implied that the court would
do so in the pending school funding case. 2 0 In Helena Elementary
School District No. 1 v. State,"' the plaintiff school districts challenged the heavy reliance on local revenue sources for support of
the public schools. The school districts argued that the system resulted in an unconstitutional discrimination because the taxable
wealth of the districts and the expenditures per student varied
greatly. 22 The complaint was based on the Montana Constitution's
equal protection clause 12' and on its provision guaranteeing equality of educational opportunity.1 2 4 Central to plaintiffs' case was the
argument that the right to education is a fundamental right for
equal protection purposes.
After a lengthy trial and one and a half years after the Bartmess decision, District Judge Henry Loble issued his decree in the
school funding case, finding Montana's school funding system unconstitutional under both Montana's equal protection clause and
the equality of educational opportunity clause.12 5 On the equal
protection issue, Judge Loble relied heavily on the Bartmess opinion and found that education is a fundamental right. In the alternative, Judge Loble found that the Montana system failed to pass
constitutional muster under the middle-tier standard of Butte
Community Union I and Bartmess.
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed Judge Loble's decision,
but based its affirmance on narrower grounds. 126 The cofirt expressly declined to reach the equal protection issue and carefully
stated that it was not ruling on whether education is a fundamental right.1 27 Instead, the court found a violation of the equality of
educational opportunity clause, rejecting the state's contention
that the provision was "an aspirational goal only."'' 2' The court
120. Id. at 272, 726 P.2d at 802. The school funding plaintiffs submitted an amicus
brief in Bartmess. The Bartmess court was very careful to point out that it was not ruling
"upon the issue of whether or not the right to education itself is a fundamental right," nor
"in any way considering a ruling upon the question of funding education in Montana." The
court stated it was "not considering any of the contentions being made that equal educational opportunity may require some specific types of funding." Id.
121. 236 Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 684 (1989).
122. Id. at 48-51, 769 P.2d at 689-90.
123. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4. No federal equal protection issue was raised because of
the holding in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) that wide
variation among school districts in spending per student caused by heavy reliance on widely
disparate local revenue sources did not violate the federal equal protection clause.
124. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1.
125. Helena Elementary School Dist., 236 Mont. at 51-52, 769 P.2d at 688.
126. Id. at 55-56, 769 P.2d at 690-91.
127. Id. at 55, 769 P.2d at 691.
128. Id., 236 Mont. at 52, 769 P.2d at 689.
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reasoned that, under the "plain meaning" doctrine, the framers of
the constitution meant what they said when they guaranteed
equality of educational opportunity.129 The court emphasized the
strength of the guarantee, stating:
As we review our Constitution, we do not find any other instance
in which the Constitution "guarantees" a particular right. We
conclude that the plain meaning of the second sentence of subsection (1) is that each person is guaranteed equality of educational
opportunity. The plain meaning of that sentence is clear and
unambiguous.'
The court also rejected the state's "local control" argument and its
argument that student performance on standardized tests, rather
than spending per student, was the appropriate indicator of equality of educational opportunity.' 31 The court concluded:
[A]s a result of the failure to adequately fund the Foundation
Program, forcing an excessive reliance on permissive and voted
levies, the State has failed to provide a system of quality public
education granting to each student the equality of educational
opportunity guaranteed under [the Montana Constitution].32
Thus, a separate principle of equality-equality of educational
opportunity-has emerged under article X, section 1 of Montana's
constitution. Because the court side-stepped the equal protection
issue, it was able to avoid articulating the specific standard by
which the discrimination there involved was to be judged. The
court laid down no specific criteria for judging educational inequalities, although it suggested to the legislature that it look to the
standard embodied in Public Law 81-874133 for incorporating federal impact funds into state equalization systems.""
The legislature partially responded to the court's mandate in
the school funding case by enacting House Bill 28 at the Special
Legislative Session in the summer of 1989.135 Plaintiffs, dissatisfied
129. Id. at 52-53, 769 P.2d at 689.
130. Id., at 53, 769 P.2d at 689 (emphasis in original).

131. Id. at 54-55, 769 P.2d at 690.
132. Id. at 55, 769 P.2d at 690.
133. Pub. L. No. 81-874, 64 Stat. 1100 (currently codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-240
(1988)).
134. Helena Elementary School Dist., 236 Mont. at 57-58, 769 P.2d at 692. The standard under P.L. 874 essentially provides that, if spending disparities are no greater than
1.25 to 1 in the 95th to 5th percentile of spending per student, then federal impact aid funds
may be incorporated into the state equalization formula. It remains to be seen how exacting
the future scrutiny of the Court will be when faced with purported inequalities in educational opportunities.
135. 1989 Mont. Laws 11 (1989) (Special Session).
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with that measure, informed the court that a future challenge
would probably ensue once the state implemented the bill. 136 Thus,
future opportunities to refine the meaning of equality of educational opportunity and apply Montana's equal protection clause to
spending disparities in public education may arise.
In sum, Montana's equality of educational opportunity provision, which has no federal counterpart, has assumed a very important role in achieving equality in the area of public education.
Thus far, the Montana Supreme Court has applied middle-tier
scrutiny only to classifications burdening constitutionally guaranteed rights to public assistance and education. Nonetheless, middle-tier scrutiny has potential application to many provisions of
Montana's constitution. There is doubt, however, about the continuing vitality of middle-tier scrutiny with the current composition
of the Montana Supreme Court. In several significant equal protection cases involving full legal redress and governmental immunity,
the court has either ignored the middle-tier approach or has explicitly refused to apply the middle-tier test without any serious
analysis of the rational set forth in Butte Community Union I for
applying the test. These cases are discussed in the following
sections.
C. Neglect of Middle-Tier Scrutiny and the Elevation of the
Federal Rational Basis Test
1. Full Legal Redress
The Montana Constitution's "full legal redress" provision has
received much judicial attention. In several important cases dealing with a citizen's right to full legal redress, the Montana Supreme Court employed an equal protection analysis to strike down
limitations on damages recoverable against the government. In
those cases the court determined that the right to full legal redress
was a fundamental right and that classifications impinging on that
right would be strictly scrutinized under an equal protection analysis. More recently, however, the court has completely retrenched in
its approach to full legal redress, finding the provision essentially
meaningless as a constitutional guarantee.
Article II, section 16 of the Montana Constitution provides:
136. See Plaintiffs' Petition of August 24, 1989, Helena Elementary School Dist. No.,
236 Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 684. By order of January 4, 1990, the Montana Supreme Court
rejected Plaintiffs' request that the court continue jurisdiction and remanded the case to the

district court for further proceedings once H.B. 28 is implemented. Thus, any future challenge will be through a new lawsuit.
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Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property, or character. No
person shall be deprived of this full legal redress for injury incurred in employment for which another person may be liable except as to fellow employees and his immediate employer who
hired him if such immediate employer provides coverage under
the workmen's compensation laws of this state. Right and justice
shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay.
The first decision to construe the full legal redress clause was Corrigan v. Janney.'37 The Janneys had leased living quarters to the
Corrigans, which were defectively wired, so that when Max Corrigan came in contact with the faucet on a bathtub, he received an
electrical shock which ultimately caused his death.' 38 The Montana
Supreme Court had previously held that "no implied warranty of
habitability in residential leases" existed and that a tenant's exclusive remedy against a landlord was to "either repair the defect by
deducting one month's rent or to vacate the premises if the defect
continue[d]."' 39 Based on these precedents, the district court held
that the Corrigans had no cause of action against the Janney's for
the defective wiring and granted summary judgment for the
defendant.'4 0
Relying on article II, section 16, The Montana Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the Montana Constitution "requires that the
plaintiff have a forum of redress for wrongful death and survival
damages. '"1 In an opinion authored by Justice Harrison, the court
stated: "It would be patently unconstitutional to deny a tenant all
causes of action for personal injuries or wrongful death arising out
of the alleged negligent management of rental premises by a landlord."'' 42 The court reasoned that the legislature could not take
away the plaintiff's cause of action for negligence without providing a substitute remedy. 14 3 In the court's view, the "repair and deduct" statute did not provide an alternative remedy for damages
caused by personal injury or wrongful death.14 4 Thus, the court
turned to the applicable negligence law to provide the plaintiffs
45
with a remedy.'
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

-

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Mont.
at -,
at -,
at -,
at
at -,
at
at -,
at -,

__, 626

626
626
626
626
626
626
626
626

P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d

P.2d 838 (1981).
at 839.
at 839.
at 839.
at 841.
at 840 (emphasis added).
at 840.
at 840.
at 840-41.
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Once having recognized the constitutional implications of the
full legal redress clause, the court began to invalidate limits on liability using an equal protection analysis. In White v. State,'0 the
court held that the right to full legal redress is a fundamental right
invoking the strict scrutiny test, and that classifications burdening
that right would be upheld only if necessary to further a compelling state interest. 47 In White the plaintiff contended that the
state was grossly negligent in permitting an allegedly violent and
dangerous person to escape from the state mental hospital at
Warm Springs, and to remain free for a period of five years without serious attempts to locate and reincarcerate him.1 4 8 Karla
White was brutally attacked by this individual about five years after the Warm Springs escape. 49
During that five-year period, the legislature had passed a statute immunizing the state and governmental units from liability for
all non-economic damages, and all economic damages in excess of
$300,000 for any one complaint.3 0 Karla White's claim was premised upon severe emotional injuries but insignificant economic
damages."" Because the statute allowed recovery to plaintiffs damaged economically up to $300,000, but totally denied recovery for
non-economic damages, White was left essentially without remedy.
The Montana Supreme Court determined that the statutory
limitation on the government's liability for damages denied equal
protection of the law.' 52 First, the statute totally denied recovery
to individuals sustaining non-economic damages who were injured
by a governmental, as opposed to a non-governmental,
tortfeasor.' 53 Second, it discriminated against persons who suffered
non-economic as opposed to economic damages. 5 On these points
the court reasoned:
In Corrigan v. Janey, this Court held that it is "patently unconstitutional" for the legislature to pass a statute which denies a
certain class of Montana citizens their cause of action for personal
injury and wrongful death. We affirm and refine our holding in
Corrigan v. Janey; we hold that the Montana Constitution guar146.
147.
148.
149.

203 Mont. 363, 661 P.2d 1272 (1983).

Id. at 368-69, 661 P.2d at 1274-75.

Id. at 366, 661 P.2d at 1273-74.
Id.
150. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-104 (1981).
151. White, 203 Mont. at 366, 661 P.2d at 1273.
152. Id. at 370, 661 P.2d at 1275.
153. See id. at 368, 661 P.2d at 1275.
154. See id. at 368-69, 661 P.2d at 1275. The court also intimated that the $300,000
limit would not withstand constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 370, 661 P.2d at 1275.
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antees that all persons have a speedy remedy for every injury.
The language 'every injury' embraces all recognized compensable
components of injury including the right to be compensated for
physical pain and mental anguish and the loss of enjoyment of
living." ' 55
Following White, the legislature adopted a new statute which
eliminated the distinction between economic and non-economic
damages, limiting full recovery against the state to $300,000 for a
single person.1 56 That limitation was challenged in Pfost v.
State.1 5 7 Pfost was injured when his truck-tractor collided with a
bridge on an icy and hazardous highway. He alleged no precautions
had been taken by the state to remedy the hazardous condition
despite the occurrence of three separate wrecks prior to his arrival.1 5 8 Pfost suffered serious injuries and his medical bills substantially exceeded $300,000.159 Using and equal protection analysis,
the Montana Supreme Court held that the statute violated Pfost's
constitutionally guaranteed right to full legal redress, because it
improperly classified victims of governmental tortfeasors, discriminating between those with minor injuries and those with catastrophic injuries. 16 0 Addressing the language of article II, section
16, the court reasoned:
The use of the clause "this full legal redress" has major significance. It obviously and grammatically refers to the "speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property, or character."
The adjective "this" means the person, thing or idea that is present or near in place, time or thought or that has just been mentioned. The constitutional framers thus construed a "speedy remedy" as comprehending "full legal redress." A state constitutional
right to full legal redress was thereby created. Any state statute
that restricts, limits, or modifies full legal redress for injury to
person, property or character therefore affects a fundamental
right and the state must show a compelling state interest if it is to
sustain the constitutional validity of the statute.""
155. Id. at 368-69, 661 P.2d at 1275 (citations omitted).
156. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-107 (1985).
157. 219 Mont. 206, 713 P.2d 495 (1986).
158. Id. at 209, 713 P.2d at 496.
159. See id.
160. Id. at 215, 216, 713 P.2d at 500, 504-05.
161. Id. at 219, 713 P.2d at 503 (citations omitted). Following the Pfost decision, a
constitutional amendment was presented by initiative to the Montana voters in 1986, in an
attempt to weaken the guarantee of full legal redress. Initiative 30 proposed deleting the
words "every injury" and "full legal redress" from art. II, § 16. See Schramm, Montana
Employment Law and the 1987 Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act: A New Order
Begins, 51 MONT. L. REV. 94, 113 (1990) [hereinafter Schramm]. While the initiative received
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While these full legal redress cases were working their way
through the courts, several developments in the area of employment law also occurred.1 62 The Montana Supreme Court first determined that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing was implied in the contract between employers and employees in
Montana.16 The court then held that breach of the covenant permitted recovery of tort damages, including punitive damages and
damages for emotional distress.'6 4 The Montana Legislature attempted to modify these common-law rulings through enactment
65
of the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act.'
That Act limited the circumstances giving rise to a cause of action
for wrongful discharge and the amounts and types of damages a
discharged employee could recover.' 6 6 It restricted damages for lost
wages, fringe benefits, and interest thereon to a maximum period
of four years from the date of discharge.' 67 Further, it eliminated
6 Finally, the
damages for pain, suffering, and emotional distress.'1
Act provided that punitive damages were recoverable only in those
cases in which the plaintiff established by clear and convincing evidence that the employer engaged in actual fraud or actual
malice.' 6
Those limitations on damages were challenged in Meech v.
Hillhaven West, Inc., Te in which the federal district court certified
two questions to the Montana Supreme Court. The first was
whether the Act denied an individual the right to "full legal redress" within the meaning of article II, section 16 of the Montana
Constitution.' 7 ' The second question was whether the provisions of
the Act "prohibit[ing] recovery for non-economic damages and
limit[ing] recovery of punitive damages" violated an individual's
a majority of votes, it was struck down by the court in State ex rel. Montana Citizens for
the Preservation of Citizens' Rights v. Waltermire, 224 Mont. 273, 738 P.2d 1255 (1987), on
the basis that errors in the voter information pamphlet circulated to the voters may have
misled them. See Schramm.
162. See Schramm, supra note 161.
163. Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co. (Gates 1), 196 Mont. 178, 184, 638 P.2d 1063,
1067 (1982).
164. Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co. (Gates I), 205 Mont. 304, 307, 668 P.2d 213,
215 (1983). See also Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hosp., 213 Mont. 488, 643 P.2d 487
(1984); Nicholson v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 219 Mont. 32, 710 P.2d 1342 (1985).

§§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1989).

165.

MONT. CODE ANN.

166.

Id. See also Schramm, supra note 161.

167.
168.
169.

MONT. CODE ANN.
MONT. CODE ANN.
MONT. CODE ANN.

170.
171.

-

§ 39-2-905(1) (1989).
§ 39-2-905(3) (1989).
§ 39-2-905(2) (1989).

Mont. -,
776 P.2d 488 (1989).
Id. at -,
776 P.2d at 489.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol51/iss2/8

26

Goetz: Interpretations of the Montana Constitution: Sometimes Socratic, Sometimes Erratic

1990]

INTERPRETATION

right to "full legal redress."17 The Montana Supreme Court, in a
decision by Justice McDonough, answered "No" to both questions 173 and expressly overruled Corrigan, White, and Pfost. 7 4 The
court examined article II, section 16 and held that it did not create
a fundamental right to full legal redress.' 7 5 Tracing the redress
provision back to the Magna Charta, Justice McDonough wrote
that the provision does not constrict legislative power, and is essentially no more than a directive to the courts that they must be
accessible to all persons without discrimination for every wrong
recognized by law as being remediable."7 6 The court held that no
person has a constitutionally vested right to a rule of common law,
noting that the legislature has historically modified the common
law in numerous instances. 1 77 The opinion criticized Pfost's grammatical construction of the full legal redress provision, and analyzed at length the Constitutional Convention debates regarding
the language which had been inserted into the provision by the
1972 Convention.' 8 Based on these debates, the court concluded
that the new language was inserted essentially "to prevent the
courts and the legislature from denying worker's compensation
claimants a cause of action against negligent third parties for job
related injuries," and not to "define 'full legal redress' as a funda' 79
mental right which could not be altered by the legislature."'
The majority opinion became muddled when the court proceeded to hold that deriving "a new fundamental right" from article II, section 16 would violate the constitutional separation of
powers provision. 8 ° The court reasoned that applying White and
Pfost to the legislation at issue could lead to the conclusion that
"while the legislature may... expand[] common-law causes of action," article II, section 16 prohibits it from restricting causes of
action created by the court. 81
This Court would act as the ultimate authority in a vast expanding, and ever changing field of law governing important social and economic rights and duties. It could exclude the legisla172. Id. at -,
173. Id. at -,
174. Id. at -,
175. Id. at __,
176. Id. at -,
179 P. 499 (1919)).
177. Id. at
178. Id. at -,
179. Id. at -,
180. Id. at -,

776 P.2d at 489-90.
776 P.2d at 490.
776 P.2d at 491.
776 P.2d at 491.
776 P.2d at 493 (citing Shea v. North Butte Mining Co., 55 Mont. 522,

776 P.2d at 493-96.
776 P.2d at 497-500.
776 P.2d at 499.
776 P.2d at 500-01. The separation of powers provision is found in
MONT. CONST. art. III, § 1.
181. Meech, Mont. at -,
776 P.2d at 500.
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appeal presents this separation of powers
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an individual's person,
actionable; what remebe given. The present
issue. 82

This statement reflects a misreading of the thrust of White and
Pfost, both of which simply held that there are fundamental rights
involved which could not be subject to discriminatory legislative
classification absent a compelling state interest. The Meech court's
separation of powers analysis incorrectly assumed that there could
be no legislative modification at all under White and Pfost, and
that any changes "could only be accomplished through constitutional amendment. '"'8 One only has to look to White v. State to
find the refutation. In White, the court upheld the feature of the
18 4
statute barring punitive damages against the state.
Turning to the equal protection issue, the court rejected not
only strict scrutiny, but also middle-tier scrutiny, based on its interpretation of article II, section 16 as "only a directive to the
courts."' 8 5 The court failed to come to grips with the rationale for
the application of middle-tier scrutiny set forth in Butte Community Union I. Instead, the court stated simply that such approach
had been applied only in cases involving welfare and education and
plunged forward into an extremely deferential rational basis analysis.186 Applying the rational basis test, the court found that the Act
was rational because it "promot[ed] Montana's economic interests,"'8 7 provided for "greater certainty in defining the employer's
duties, 18 8 and provided "a reasonably just substitute for the common-law causes it abrogate[d]. ' 89
Justice Sheehy filed a strident dissent, in which he stated:
This is the blackest judicial day in the eleven years that I have
sat on this Court. Indeed it may be the blackest judicial day in
the history of the state .... The decision today cleans the scalpel
for the legislature to cut away unrestrainedly at the whole field of
tort redress. Perhaps worse by this decision today, the Court
throws in the sponge as a co-equal in our tripartite state
government.'"0
182.
183.

Id. at
Id. at

-,
-,

776 P.2d at 500.
776 P.2d at 501.

184.

White, 203 Mont. at 370-71, 661 P.2d at 1275-76.

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Meech, - Mont. at -,
776 P.2d at 502.
Id. at -,
776 P.2d at 502.
Meech, Mont. at -,
776 P.2d at 504.
Id. at -, 776 P.2d at 505.
Id. at -,
776 P.2d at 506.

190. Id. at

776 P.2d at 507 (Sheehy, J., dissenting). Justice Hunt joined in Justice
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Justice Sheehy asserted that the majority misunderstood what
Corrigan, White, and Pfost stood for. He contended "Corrigan established that when a cause of action is grounded on statute the
right of a plaintiff to a full legal redress under that statute [is]
fundamental."' 9 Moreover, "White and Pfost established that
when a statute discriminated invidiously between injured plaintiffs, the courts under Article II, Sec. 16 would apply exacting scrutiny to determine the necessity, if any, for the discrimination. '" '92
According to Justice Sheehy, these results "were commanded by
the language of Art. II, Sec. 16."'11
Justice Sheehy was particularly critical of the majority's determination that article II, section 16 did not create a fundamental
right to full legal redress. He quoted the chairman of the Bill of
Rights Committee who, speaking in support of eliminating governmental immunity, stated: 'We submit it's an inalienable right to
have a remedy when someone injures you through negligence and
through wrongdoing, regardless of whether he has the status of a
governmental servant or not."9 Justice Sheehy then reasoned:
The right of a citizen to claim justice from his state, is, we should
agree, a fundamental right; else the right of petition for redress
from grievances is meaningless. State protection of citizens from
injustice, a fortiori, is also a fundamental right; else the right of
petition is toothless.
A legal remedy that delivers only 25% percent justice automatically delivers 75% injustice. Assuming a wrong-doing employer, a legal remedy that delivers to the long-term employee
only four working years of justice delivers also the balance of a
working lifetime of injustice. For justice is not divisible. Either
the result is just or it is unjust, just as a single fact is true or else
it is untrue. There is no middle to justice, for injustice takes up
where partial justice ends. In defining justice, we do not mess
with Mr. In-Between. As surely as there are fundamental rights
there are surely no fundamental half-rights. The right of access to
courts is only part of the fundamental right; the right to a full
legal remedy completes the part to make a whole. The two, access
to the courts and full redress, indivisibly make one fundamental
right, and together they are the essence of justice. They must coexist to complete the fundamental right to justice.'9 5
Sheehy's dissent. Id. at
191.

Id. at

-,

-,

776 P.2d at 517.

776 P.2d at 514.

192. Id. at -, 776 P.2d at 514 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at -, 776 P.2d at 514 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at -, 776 P.2d at 514 (Sheehy, J., dissenting) (quoting VI
supra note 100, at 1764) (emphasis Justice Sheehy's)).
195.

Id. at

-,

TRANSCRIPTS,

776 P.2d at 514.
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Thus, in the short span of six years between White and
Meech, the court moved from a position that the full legal redress
declaration is a fundamental guarantee to a position that it is
merely a meaningless directive. The plunge was precipitous, with
nary a nod to the importance of the right or a conceivable middletier approach. In this arena, results appear to be more important
than principled analysis.
2.

196
Sovereign Immunity.

The people's right to redress has eroded even more markedly
under the sovereign immunity provision. Article II, section 18 of
the Montana Constitution originally eliminated sovereign immunity, making government financially responsible to the people for
its faults. In 1974, however, that provision was amended by a vote
of the people to provide an exception allowing the legislature to
impose immunity by a two-thirds vote of each house of the legislature. The section now reads: "The state, counties, cities, towns,
and all other local governmental entities shall have no immunity
from suit for injury to a person or property, except as may be specifically provided by law by a 2/3 vote of each house of the
legislature."
The first important decision under article II, section 18 occurred prior to the 1974 amendment, in Noll v. City of Bozeman.197 The legislature had enacted the Montana Comprehensive
State Insurance Plan and Tort Claims Act,198 which required all
claims against the state to be filed with the Secretary of State
within 120 days from the date the claim arose or should reasonably
have been discovered. 199 Noll failed to file within the 120 days, but
challenged the filing limitation as inconsistent with article II, section 18.2°° The court found the 120-day provision inconsistent with
article II, section 18, observing that "the record of the 1972 Constitutional Convention clearly indicates the framers intended to provide redress for all persons, whether victims of governmental or
private torts." 0 1 The court rejected the city of Bozeman's argu196. The sovereign immunity issue is treated in greater depth in an accompanying
article in this issue. See Comment, Sovereign Immunity Returns to Montana, infra this
issue (authored by John Kutzman).
197. 166 Mont. 504, 534 P.2d 880 (1975).
198. The Act was then codified as REV. CODES MONT. §§ 82-4301 to -4327 (1947).
199. Nol, 166 Mont. at 505-06, 534 P.2d at 881.
200. Id. at 505, 534 P.2d at 881.
201. Id. at 507, 534 P.2d at 882. The court quoted the Bill of Rights Committee report
to the Convention: "The committee finds this reasoning repugnant to the fundamental premise of the American justice: all parties should receive fair and just redress whether the
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ment that the 120-day requirement was nothing more than a statute of limitation which the legislature has the power to adopt. Instead, it held that the requirement "creates a condition precedent
to the government's waiver of immunity," and that "[s]uch restrictions on the abolition of sovereign immunity destroy the constitutional grant itself and are clearly unconstitutional."'2 0 2
The first case to directly address the sovereign immunity provision after the 1974 amendment was Pfost v. State.2 °3 In Pfost,
the court rejected the state's argument that the legislature has authority to act under the sovereign immunity provision as amended
without regard to the full legal redress clause.20 " The Pfost court
struck down limitations on liability based on a determination that
the right to full legal redress is a fundamental right and the classification between governmental tortfeasors and other tortfeasors
did not pass muster under strict scrutiny.20 5 Thus, the sovereign
immunity provision did not prevent the court from invalidating
the classification based on a fundamental rights analysis of article
II, section 16 and the equal protection clause.
The most recent cases dealing with sovereign immunity have
abruptly departed company with White and Pfost and have severely eroded the public's right to sue the government for damages. In Bieber v. Broadwater County, 0° a precursor to the Meech
case, a five-judge panel of the Montana Supreme Court, without
oral argument, undercut the holding in White and Pfost that the
right to full legal redress under article II, section 16 is a fundamental right.20 7 In Bieber, the court held that the acts of a county commissioner in firing an employee were immune from suit under
Montana Code Annotated, section 2-9-111 (legislative immunity),
and found no equal protection violation.20 8 In language directly
contrary to White and Pfost, the five-member panel of Justices
stated:
injuring party is a private citizen or a governmental agency." Id. at 508, 534 P.2d at 882
(quoting II TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 100, at 637).
202. Id. at 508-09, 534 P.2d at 882. In State v. District Court, 175 Mont. 63, 66, 572
P.2d 201, 203 (1977), the state argued that it was immune from a suit for a death claim as a
result of the 1974 constitutional amendment. The court, however, rejected that argument
because the 1973 Montana Comprehensive State Insurance Plan and Tort Claims Act was
still in effect. Id. The court held that the mere fact that the provision in the Constitution
had been amended did not alter the extant legislation. Id.
203. 219 Mont. 206, 713 P.2d 495 (1985).
204. Id., 219 Mont. at 223, 713 P.2d at 505.
205. Id., 219 Mont. at 206, 713 P.2d at 501-505.
206. 232 Mont. 487, 759 P.2d 145 (1988).
207. Id., 232 Mont. at 491, 759 P.2d at 148.
208. Id. at 490-91, 759 P.2d at 147-48.
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Article II, Section 16 of the Montana Constitution guarantees citizens access to the courts of this state for the redress of wrongs
done to them. This Court has said that access to the courts is not
an independent fundamental right. We so stated in Linder v.
Smith and consequently used a rational basis analysis to conclude
that the Montana Medical Malpractice Panel Act did not violate
Article II, Section 16. This is the appropriate standard to use for
the purposes of equal protection analysis in this case."0 9
The court thus upheld the classification based on the "oft articulated rationale for retaining governmental immunity," that it "prevents ...law making processes from being hampered or influenced
by frivolous lawsuits." 10 Curiously the court's language seems to
imply that all lawsuits (or at least those against public entities) are
"frivolous," which is a strange position for a court to take.
The procedures followed in reaching the Bieber decision were
justifiably criticized by Justice Sheehy in his dissent in Peterson v.
Great Falls School District No. 1.211 There, Justice Sheehy stated:
"When Bieber was decided, I was not a member of the panel to
which the case had been assigned. Unfortunately that decision was
made without oral argument by less than a full Court. Ordinarily
this Court does not decide constitutional questions unless the full
21 2
Court is represented.9
In Peterson, the court relied on Bieber in applying the legislative immunity statute21 3 to a school district's act of terminating a
teacher's employment. The immunity in Peterson, however, extended beyond the immunity in Bieber. In Peterson, the person
terminating the employee was not a member of the governing body
(the school board), but rather, was an agent or employee of that
body.21 4 The court held, however, that immunity extended to such
persons and that "[t]he discharge was ratified by the school board
at its regularly scheduled meeting. '9 1 5 Thus, as in Bieber, the court
rejected the challenge to the legislative immunity statute under article II, section 16 of the Montana Constitution, reasoning that
209. Id. at 491, 759 P.2d at 148 (citations omitted).
210. Id.
211. 237 Mont. 376, 381, 773 P.2d 316, 319 (1989) (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 383, 773 P.2d at 320 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
213. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-111 (1989).
214. Peterson, 237 Mont. at 379, 773 P.2d at 318.
215. Id. Justice Sheehy criticized this decision as extending legislative immunity far
beyond its purpose, arguing that "[a] body acts legislatively when it sets policy, or adopts
regulations for the enforcement of its policies." Id. at 382, 773 P.2d at 319 (Sheehy, J.,
dissenting). He argued: "Thus administrators, foremen, and janitors are covered under legislative immunity. That I submit is a bad result, and is a bad interpretation of § 2-9-111
MCA." Id.
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"access to courts is not a fundamental right" and that "the State
need only show a rational relationship to a legitimate State
2 16
interest.
The legislative immunity of Montana Code Annotated, section
2-9-111, has recently been carried to absurd lengths in Eccleston v.
Montana Third Judicial District Court.21 7 In that case, the court
extended legislative immunity to allegedly tortious conduct of
school janitors on the basis that janitors are agents of the school
board, a legislative body.2 18 The sovereign immunity section of the
Montana Constitution as amended allows exceptions "as may be
specifically provided by law by a 2/3 vote of each house of the legislature.'2 19 Despite this explicit language, the court has seized upon
the ambiguities in the Montana statute, whose title refers to "legislative" immunity, but the body of which is susceptible to broad
inclusion of all "agents" of legislative bodies. 22 0 The result has
been that the exception has swallowed up the rule. The court's effort to protect the public fisc from damage actions (in spite of the
availability, and in most cases the actuality, of insurance) has come
at the great expense of those persons who are injured as a result of
governmental actions.
D.

The Right to Privacy, The Right to be Free From Illegal
Searches and Seizures, and the Public's Right to Know

Article II, section 10 of the Montana Constitution provides:
"The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a
free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a
2 2 No counterpart to this provision
compelling state interest.""
exists in the federal constitution. The United States Supreme Court,
however, has found a right to privacy by implication in various areas, including reproductive freedom and abortion, based on a combination of federal constitutional provisions.22 2
216. Id. at 380, 773 P.2d at 318.
217. - Mont. _ 783 P.2d at 363 (1989).
218. Id. at -,
783 P.2d at 368.
219. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 18 (emphasis added).
220. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-111(b) (1989) reads in part: "(2) A governmental entity is
immune from suit for an act or omission of its legislative body or a member, officer, or agent
thereof. (3) A member, officer, or agent of a legislative body is immune from suit for damages arising from the lawful discharge of an official duty associated with the introduction or
consideration of legislation or action by the legislative body."
221. See Elison & NettikSimmons, Right of Privacy, 48 MONT. L. REV. 1 (1987), for an
extensive treatment of this provision.
222. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972) (constitutional right to choose birth control means); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) (right or privacy to choose abortion).
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Privacy law in Montana has evolved in two rather distinct areas. The first area is search and seizure law, in which the right to
privacy has been combined with the protection against illegal
search and seizure, contained in article II, section 11.223 The second area involves cases in which the right to privacy has clashed
with the public's right to know, guaranteed by article II, section 9.
This section discusses developments in these two areas of privacy
law and examines the scope of the right to know provision when no
competing privacy interest is involved.
1. Privacy and Search and Seizure
Search and seizure challenges under the Montana Constitution
involve both the right to privacy and the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Montana Constitution's
search and seizure provision, found in article II, section 11, is
nearly identical to the fourth amendment. It provides: "No warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing shall issue
without describing the place to be searched or the person or thing
to be seized, or without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing.""24
Following adoption of the 1972 Constitution, the Montana Supreme Court was slow to articulate distinct state constitutional
standards for privacy protection. 2 5 With several notable exceptions, the Montana Supreme Court has generally followed the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourth
amendment when analyzing search and seizure issues under the
Montana Constitution.2 2' 6 However, Montana's privacy provision
223. See generally Survey, Criminal Procedure: The Exclusionary Rule, 40 MONT. L.
REV. 132, 133 (1979) (authored by Sol Lovas).
224. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11.
225. In State v. Coburn, 165 Mont. 488, 530 P.2d 442 (1972), the court merely mentioned that Montana has a constitutional right of privacy independent of the federal right,
but did nothing more.
226. For example, in 1983, the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the
Fourth Amendment, adopted a "totality of circumstances" test in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213 (1983) to determine the standard for issuance of search warrants, thereby abandoning
the earlier, more stringent two-pronged test, known as the "Aguilar-Spinelli test." The
Aguilar-Spinelli test required recital in the affidavit of a specific basis for relying on the tip
of an undisclosed informant. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969)). The Montana Supreme Court followed suit without specifically
analyzing whether Montana privacy provisions called for a more stringent standard. State v.
Kelly, 205 Mont. 417, 668 P.2d 1032 (1983); State v. Crain, 223 Mont. 167, 725 P.2d 209
(1986). Thus, under these interpretations of the court, in assessing the sufficiency of affidavits in support of search warrants under the Montana constitutional provisions, Montana
looks to the Gates "totality of circumstances" test, and the Montana standard is essentially
indistinguishable from the federal standard. No additional showing need be made by the
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has served as a basis for the court to diverge from the federal
search and seizure decisions in several instances. The court has
taken an independent approach in the areas of inventory searches,
searches by private individuals, and warrantless consensual monitoring. 2 7 The greater protection afforded individuals against private searches and warrantless consensual monitoring was fleeting,
however, as the court reversed its course in more recent years and
adopted the federal standards in these areas.
Montana continues to stand apart from the federal courts in
automobile and personal inventory searches incident to arrest. In
State v. Sawyer,2 s for example, the court relied on the privacy
provision to prohibit warrantless inventory searches of automobiles
incident to arrest.229 Although, the United States Supreme Court
has upheld the constitutionality of such searches, 3 0 the Montana
Supreme Court deemed this type of search "a significant invasion
of individual privacy," which violated the privacy provision of
Montana's constitution. 31
Moreover, in State v. Sierra,32 the court struck down an inventory search, holding that Montana's privacy provision was more
protective than the fourth amendment. 233 The state, relying primarily on decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 234 argued

that the inventory search fostered legitimate state interests such as
safeguarding the arrested person's property, protecting law enforcement officials from false claims of loss or theft, avoiding danstate, notwithstanding Montana's explicit constitutional provisions regarding privacy.
227. Montana law also diverges from federal law on the rationale for requiring a written affidavit in support of a search warrant. Under federal law, a supporting affidavit must
be reduced to writing, but the case law is based on Rule 41(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, rather than on the fourth amendment. Article II, section 11 of the Montana
Constitution mandates that such an affidavit be reduced to writing. The Montana Supreme
Court relied on that provision in refusing to permit the state to buttress an otherwise deficient affidavit in support of a search warrant with oral testimony from the issuing judge.
State v. Thompson, 182 Mont. 119, 594 P.2d 1137 (1979).
228. 174 Mont. 512, 571 P.2d 1131 (1977).
229. Id. at 518, 571 P.2d at 1134. The court limited its holding, however, to permit
police to seize items in plain view. Id. The court reasoned that such a rule adequately balances the individual's right of privacy against the government's need to assure that property
is not stolen from impounded vehicles. Id.
230. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (fourth amendment does not
preclude warrantless police inventory searches of automobiles incident to arrest).
231. Sawyer, 174 Mont. 517, 571 P.2d at 1133-34. See also Comment, Taking New
Rights Seriously-III. Rights in Collision: The Individual Right of Privacy and the Public
Right to Know, 39 MoNT. L. REV. 249, 252-253 (1978) (authored by David Gorman) [hereinafter Gorman].
232. 214 Mont. 472, 692 P.2d 1273 (1985).
233. Id.
234. E.g. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
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gers from the contents of uninventoried packages, and assisting in
identifying arrested persons.2 35 In a four-three decision, the Montana Supreme Court rejected that rationale, finding that there are
"less-intrusive" means of accomplishing the same purposes.2 " Justice Shea, writing for the majority, observed:
As long as we guarantee the minimum rights guaranteed by the
United States Constitution, we are not compelled to march lockstep with pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court if
our own constitutional provisions call for more individual rights
protection than that guaranteed by the United States
23 7
Constitution.
The holdings In Sawyer and Sierra still stand today.
One of the more interesting, albeit fleeting, departures from
the federal fourth amendment occurred in the area of private
searches, or searches by individuals not acting under the color of
the state. From 1971 until 1985, the Montana Supreme Court repeatedly held that private searches invaded privacy rights protected by the Montana Constitution and, therefore, were properly
subject to the exclusionary rule.2 3 For example, in State v.
Hyem, 1 the court relied on Montana's right to privacy, stating,
"[T]here cannot be a fictional difference between classes of citizens: those who are commanded to obey the constitution and
those who are not. Our constitutional prohibition against unreasonable invasion of privacy applies to all persons, whether acting
for the state or privately. ' 24 0 This contrasted with the federal rule,
which limited the application of the exclusionary rule to acts of the
sovereign.2 4 1 The Hyem court further held that the exclusionary
rule was not a mere rule of procedure, but was rooted in the constitution itself. Justice Sheehy, writing for the majority, stated, "[The
exclusionary rule] is paste and cover for the bones of our individual constitutional rights, without which such rights were in danger
235. Sierra, 214 Mont. at 475-76, 692 P.2d at 1275.
236. Id. at 477, 692 P.2d at 1276.
237. Id. at 476, 692 P.2d at 1276.
238. The Montana rule was first articulated in State v. Brecht 157 Mont. 264, 485 P.2d
47 (1971) and was followed in various cases. See State v. Coburn, 165 Mont. 488, 530 P.2d
442 (1974); State v. Helfrich, 183 Mont. 484, 600 P.2d 816 (1979); State v. Hyem, - Mont.
-,
630 P.2d 202 (1981); State v. Van Haele, 199 Mont. 522, 649 P.2d 1311 (1982). See also
Duran v. Buttrey Foods, Inc., 189 Mont. 381, 616 P.2d 327 (1980); State v. Sayers, 199
Mont. 228, 648 P.2d 291 (1982); State v. Sykes, Mont. -, 663 P.2d 691 (1983). The
exclusionary rule simply prohibits admission of evidence obtained in violation of certain
constitutional rights of the defendant.
239.
240.

-

Mont. -,
630 P.2d 202 (1981).
Id., at -,
630 P.2d at 206.

241.

See e.g. Burdeau v. McDowell 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
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of becoming an unfleshed skeleton."2 4
In 1985, the Montana Supreme Court reversed this line of
cases in which the exclusionary rule was applied to private
searches and seizures. In State v. Long,2" s the court held that the
restriction against illegal searches and seizures applied only to governmental action.2 " The court, in an opinion by Justice Morrison,
reasoned that the language "without the showing of a compelling
state interest" indicated that the framers of the Montana Constitution intended the privacy clause to apply only to state action and
not to private action.2 " The court further reasoned that,
"[h]istorically, constitutions have been means for people to address
their government. '24 6 Finally, the court compared the language in
the privacy clause to the language in the individual dignity
clause. 1 7 It pointed out that while article II, section 4 prohibits
discrimination by private individuals as well as by the state, "the
privacy section does not address private individuals. 2 8 Noting
that Montana was out of step with all other jurisdictions, the court
reversed a long line of private search cases.24 9
In a lengthy, impassioned dissent, Justice Sheehy argued:
ITihe framers in 1972 had a beautiful conception: They felt the
force of our tradition that each person ought to mind his own
business; they saw the home as a place of refuge, peace and security. They provided that a wall of law should be erected against all
onslaught except when the compelling interest of the state demanded otherwise. Private persons do not act for the State. Intruders into privacy may be nothing more than nosy neighbors,
busybodies, or snitches. The framers extended the right of privacy especially against these.
Gone is that beautiful conception. Left only are the minimum protections of the Federal Constitution, which nowhere expressly guarantees individual privacy. Federally, our privacy
rights are no more than the shifting courts are inclined to allow.
Under our State Constitution, our individual privacy rights are
expressly stated to be paramount. The framers unfortunately did
not foresee that this Court would dilute their positive declaration
in Art. II, Section 10, by reading into its clear language some dar242.

Hyem,

-

Mont.

-,

630 P.2d at 208.

243. 216 Mont. 65, 700 P.2d 153 (1985).
244. Id. at 67-69, 700 P.2d at 155-56.
245. Id. at 71, 700 P.2d at 157.
246. Id. at 70, 700 P.2d at 156.
247. Id. at 70, 700 P.2d at 156-57.
248. Id. at 71, 700 P.2d at 157. Of course, it literally does not exclude application to
private individuals, either.
249. Id. at 69-70, 700 P.2d at 156-57.
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kling exception. This Court has stamped "approved" on the nettlesome intruders, the nosy ones, the busy ones, the snitches. It
' 250
has said welcome to the "Big Spy Country."
Thus, since Long, Montana has marched in synchrony with the
federal interpretation of the fourth amendment on the private
search issue.
The other temporary departure from the fourth amendment
involved warrantless consensual electronic surveillance by police
officers. From 1978 to 1988, the court relied on the privacy provision to hold that face-to-face consensual monitoring by police
without a search warrant violated an individual's right to privacy
under Montana's constitution.2 1' The remedy for such a violation
was the exclusion of the evidence at trial.2 52 The court also required police to demonstrate a compelling state interest justifying
such surveillance prior to employing it in an investigation.25 3
During this 10-year period, the court struggled to articulate a
definite standard to assess privacy invasions by the police. The
court repeatedly turned to the justifiable expectation of privacy
standard adopted by the United States Supreme Court.2 54 Under
that standard, a person's right to privacy is limited by the person's
subjective expectation of privacy and society's willingness to deem
that expectation reasonable and therefore worthy of protection. 55
The court relied on this justifiable expectation of privacy standard
to carve out an exception to its general rule and permitted war5
rantless consensual surveillance by telephone.1
The most interesting case in which the court excluded evidence obtained by warrantless face-to-face electronic surveillance
was State v. Solis.2 57 In a sharply divided plurality decision, the
Solis court held that a warrantless video-taped conversation be250. Id. at 81, 700 P.2d at 164 (Sheehy, J., dissenting). Justice Morrison took the "unusual step" of "concurring" in order to reply to the dissent of Justice Sheehy to argue that
the majority opinion could not be accurately taken to mean that Montana had no heightened right of privacy under article II, section 10. Id. at 84, 700 P.2d at 166 (Morrison, J.,
concurring).
251. See State v. Brackman, 178 Mont. 105, 582 P.2d 1216 (1978) (defendant's right of
privacy violated by face-to-face consensual surveillance involving police agent). Brackman
was overruled in State v. Brown, 232 Mont. 1, 755 P.2d 1364 (1988).
252. Brackman, at 117, 582 P.2d at 1222.
253. Id. at 116, 582 P.2d at 1222.
254. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 293 (1967); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971).
255. Id.
256. See State v. Hanley, 186 Mont. 410, 608 P.2d 104 (1980); State v. Coleman, 189
Mont. 492, 616 P.2d 1090 (1980).
257. 214 Mont. 310, 693 P.2d 518 (1984).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol51/iss2/8

38

Goetz: Interpretations of the Montana Constitution: Sometimes Socratic, Sometimes Erratic

1990]

INTERPRETATION

tween a criminal suspect and an undercover officer posing as a
pawn shop proprietor should be suppressed as an invasion of the
suspect's privacy.2 58 The court assessed whether the defendant had
a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether a compelling state
interest existed to conduct such surveillance, and held that police
must obtain a search warrant based on probable cause before conducting such surveillance, except in exigent circumstances. 59
The court applied a test identical to the federal justifiable expectation of privacy standard to determine whether the suspect's
privacy had been infringed. 0 0 In concluding that the suspect possessed a subjective expectation of privacy, Justice Morrison noted
that the suspect spoke only to the undercover police officer in a
small, enclosed room.26 Furthermore, the court concluded that the
suspect's expectation of privacy was reasonable, because "[t]here
were no, visible, separate areas from which other individuals may
262
have overheard the conversations.
The state relied on United States v. White26 3 in arguing that
2 64
there was no privacy interest in the video-taped conversation.
The state also relied on a prior case in which the court reaffirmed
its position that 'interception of telephone conversations by police
officers is legal if one of the parties to the conversation consents,
even an informer.'26 5 The majority rejected the federal analysis in
White stating: "This Court is not bound by decisions of the United
States Supreme Court where independent grounds exist for reaching a contrary result.2166 The court then cited Constitutional Convention debates regarding the individual's right to privacy, noting
the keen concern the delegates had regarding surreptitious electronic eavesdropping. 2 7 The court distinguished a telephone conversation, in which a person has no way of knowing whether another person is listening, from a face-to-face conversation, holding
that "in face-to-face encounters in a private setting, there is a rea258. Id. at 320, 693 P.2d at 523.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 413, 693 P.2d at 520. "We must use a two-part test to determine whether
an individual has a constitutionally protected right of privacy: (1) the individual must have
either a subjective or an actual expectation of privacy; and (2) that expectation must be
viewed by society as reasonable." Id.
261. Id. at 413, 693 P.2d at 520.
262. Id.
263. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
264. Solis, 214 Mont. at 315, 693 P.2d at 520.
265. Id. at 314-315, 693 P.2d at 520 (quoting State v. Coleman, 189 Mont. 492, 502,
616 P.2d 1090, 1096 (1980).
266. Id. at 316, 693 P.2d at 521.
267. Id. at 318, 693 P.2d at 522.
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sonable expectation that hidden monitoring is not taking place. 2 68
The Solis court held, however, that an invasion of the right to
privacy would not be foreclosed if the state could show a compelling interest which justified infringing on an individual's privacy. 219
The court determined that the state possesses a compelling interest in enforcing 'its criminal laws for the benefit and protection of
other fundamental rights of its citizens.' 7 The court acknowledged that a compelling interest existed to infringe upon the suspect's privacy right in the instant case, because of the suspect's
repeated criminal conduct.171 It noted, however, that such compelling interest may "usually occur only within certain procedural
safeguards. 2' 72 Thus absent exigent circumstances, the state was
required to show probable cause to support the issuance of a
search warrant.2 7 3
In 1988, however, the court reversed Solis in State v.
Brown.2 74 The Brown court held that warrantless, face-to-face consensual monitoring does not violate a suspect's justifiable expectation of privacy. 27 The court reasoned that one who talks freely to
another has no justifiable expectation that what is said will be kept
private by the other.278 In so holding, the court did away with two
previous requirements. No longer must the state demonstrate a
compelling state interest to engage in such surveillance or obtain a
search warrant based on probable cause prior to such investigations. The decision substantially aligned Montana and federal law
in this area and abandoned the added privacy protection developed during the preceding decade by the Montana courts. The net
result is that the court's former bold pronouncements that it will
not march in synchrony with the United States Supreme Court
now ring hollow.
The Brown court allowed limited room for future challenges to
warrantless police consensual surveillance which is excessively intrusive. The court did not, however, set forth examples or guidelines as to what it might deem excessive police surveillance in this
context.277 The end result appears to be an implicit proclamation,
268. Id. at 318, 693 P.2d at 522.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 319, 522 P.2d at 522 (quoting State ex rel. Zander v. District Court, 180
Mont. 548, 556, 591 P.2d 656, 660 (1979)).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. 232 Mont. 1, 8, 11, 755 P.2d 1364, 1369, 1371 (1988).
275. Id.
276. Id. at 10-11, 755 P.2d at 1370.
277. Id. at -,
755 P.2d at 1370-71.
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contrary to Justice Morrison's statement in Solis, 278 that
Montanans do not possess a reasonable expectation that those to
whom they speak are not government agents carrying electronic
bugging devices.
2. Rights in Collision: The Individual's Right to Privacy
2 9
Versus the Public's Right to Know 7
Much of Montana's privacy law is integrally related to the
contrasting right of the public to observe the deliberations of public bodies. Article II, section 9 of the Montana Constitution provides: "No person shall be deprived of the right to examine documents or to observe the deliberations of all public bodies or
agencies of state government and its subdivisions, except in cases
in which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure." 80 The 1972 "right to know" provision affords the public and the press broad rights to observe the deliberations of governmental bodies and to secure information from
governmental agencies.2 8 1
An obvious tension exists between the right to know provision
and the right to individual privacy. This tension has given rise to a
number of important cases in which the Montana Supreme Court
has had to develop a standard for resolving the conflict between
the two rights. These cases involve three general categories of information: trade secrets, information about public employees, and
information kept by public agencies. These categories are treated
below.
278. Solis, 214 Mont. at 413, 693 P.2d at 520.
279. See Gorman, supra note 231.
280. The right to know was elevated to explicit constitutional status in the 1972 Constitution, long after being recognized in the common law and the Montana statutes. Since its
adoption in 1972, the constitutional provision has been further implemented through legislation. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-3-201 to -221 (1989); see generally Gorman, supra note 231,
at 259-60.
281. See e.g. Great Falls Tribune v. District Court, 186 Mont. 433, 608 P.2d 116
(1980), in which the Montana Supreme Court held that the public and press had a right,
under art. II, § 9, to observe jury selection in a sensational criminal case. The court noted

that the

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

does not require that a pre-trial suppression hearing

be open to the public. Id. at 437, 608 P.2d at 119 (citing Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. 368 (1979) (Gannett is now of questionable vitality in light of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)). The court in Great Falls Tribune refused to
follow the federal precedent, stating that "the Montana Constitution imposes a stricter
standard in order to authorize closure than does the United States Constitution. Art. II, Sec.
9 of the Montana Constitution has no counterpart in the Federal Constitution." Id., 186
Mont. at 440, 608 P.2d at 120.
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a. Corporate Privacy Versus the Right to Know
The first important case involving tension between the right to
know and the right to privacy was Mountain States Telephone &
Telegraph Co. v. Department of Public Service Regulation.28 2
That case posed a difficult question concerning rights of a corporation to privacy protection under article II, section 10. In connection with a rate increase application filed by Mountain Bell before
the Public Service Commission (PSC), the Montana Consumer
Counsel (MCC) served upon Mountain Bell certain data requests.
Mountain Bell filed objections contending that the requested information consisted of trade secrets, but offered to make the information available to the PSC and MCC subject to PSC's entry of a
proposed protective order.2 83 The PSC denied Mountain Bell's motion for a protective order on the grounds that "a corporation is
not entitled to the protection of the individual privacy exception
under the 1972 Montana Constitution,... and that [all] parties of
record should be able to examine all documents in a rate increase
proceeding..
28
District Judge Bennett agreed with the PSC that a corporation is not entitled to the "individual privacy" protection that
forms an exception to the right to know provision in article II, section 9, and denied the protective order on those grounds. 5 The
282.
283.
284.

- Mont. __, 634 P.2d 181 (1981).
Id. at __, 634 P.2d at 183.
Id. Mountain Bell challenged statutes providing for the citizens' right to inspect
(MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-105 (1979)), and the citizens' right to inspect and copy records
(MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 2-6-102 (1979)). Mountain States Tel & Tel., __ Mont. at

-,

634

P.2d at 184.
285. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 183. Judge Bennett determined that, even though a corporation has no individual privacy interest under art. II,§ 9, such principle does not strip a
private corporation of all rights to protect its trade secrets. He noted that '[wihile the privacy interest of the corporation may not be placed in the balance in considering the public's
"right to know" guaranteed by Article II, Section 9 of our constitution,' the corporation had
other rights, including 'the right of the corporation to due process of law before being deprived of its property, . . . which are not necessarily abrogated by its lack of entitlement
under the "right to know" provision.' Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 18. Judge Bennett, however,
found persuasive the PSC's reasoning that all parties of record "should be able to examine
all documents" upon which the PSC would base its decision and upon which Mountain Bell
relied in filing its request for increased revenues. Id. at -,
634 P.2d at 85.
The determination that a corporation does not come within the protection of "individual privacy" seems consistent with the Constitutional Convention debates on the issue:
DELEGATE HELIKER: Mr. Dahood, being an ignorant nonlawyer, what is an
individual?
DELEGATE HELIKER: Is it by any chance also a corporation?
DELEGATE DAHOOD: A person can, of course, Dr. Heliker, as you well know, be
defined to include a corporation under the law.
DELEGATE HELIKER: I know a person can, but can an individual?
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Montana Supreme Court, however, in an opinion by Justice
Sheehy, reversed, holding that trade secrets are a "species of property that is entitled to constitutional protection."'2 8' The court further held that any discriminatory treatment between individuals
and corporations for the purpose of the privacy exclusion in article
II, section 9 would be subject to federal equal protection analysis. 2 87 On this point, the court reasoned that regardless of what the
state constitutional provision means, it could not contravene federal constitutional standards, and that the distinction between corporations and private individuals therefore must fall. 88
Since we have determined that a trade secret is a species of
private property, the right to hold that property is a fundamental
right. If the PSC were to be upheld in its ruling that the 1972
Mont. Const. Art. II, Sec. 9, covers individuals but not corporations, it would be necessary that we find a compelling state interest for such classification to avoid the implications of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We find no such
compelling state interest. A corporation is a "person" within the
due process and equal protection clauses
of the Fourteenth
2 89
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

The court further reasoned that even if there were no equal
protection violation, there nevertheless was a fourteenth amendment due process violation in the refusal of the PSC to grant the
protective order, because of the important property interest in the
trade secrets.2 90 Thus, while the PSC was entitled to the information, Mountain Bell was entitled to a protective order to protect its
DELEGATE DAHOOD: An individual, in my judgment, would not be a corporation, no.
V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 100, at 1680.
286. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., at -,
634 P.2d at 185.
287. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 188-89.
288. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 188-89. Judge Bennett avoided the equal protection challenge of Mountain Bell by determining that the PSC "would have applied the 'right to
know' provision even-handedly, both to individuals and to corporations .... Id. at -,
634
P.2d at 188. Presumably, Judge Bennett meant that, had the trade secret protective order
been requested by a private person rather than a corporation, the PSC would have denied
the protective order as well. While the Supreme Court indicated that it was inclined to
agree that such provision would have been applied equally to an individual or corporation it
held:
Nevertheless, we put this possible corporate classification to rest, as an unequal
application of the right to know provision, by stating that the demands of individual privacy of a corporation as well as of a person might clearly exceed the merits
of public disclosure, and thus come within the exception of the right to know
provision.
Id. at -,
634 P.2d at 188.
289. Id. at -,
634 P.2d at 188 (citations omitted).
290. Id.
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trade secrets.2 9 The court then summarized its analysis as follows:
We have thus balanced the rights that all citizens acquired under
the right to know provision of the state constitution with the purpose and function for which our laws compel disclosure by utilities of trade secrets. The right to know provision was designed to
prevent the elevation of a state czar or oligarchy; it was not
designed for, nor will we substitute, the tyranny of a
proletariat."" 2
b.

The Privacy of Public Employees Versus the Right to
Know

Shortly after Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
the court faced another conflict between the right to privacy and
the right to know in Montana Human Rights Division v. City of
Billings.29 3 There, the Human Rights Commission (HRC), in investigating charges of discrimination against the city of Billings, requested from the city certain personnel files and employment and
application information, so that it could adequately assess the discrimination claims. The city refused to turn over the information
without the consent of the persons whose files were requested, because release of that information might involve an invasion of the
privacy of those individuals.2 9' The district court determined that
the requested information fell within the protection of article II,
section 10, that the city of Billings could not "provide the information without the consent of the individuals whose right of privacy
[was] affected," and that the HRC had shown neither a compelling
state interest in obtaining the information, nor exhaustion of other
sources for obtaining the [desired] information. 95
The Montana Supreme Court, in approaching the question, reviewed the constitutional history of article II, section 10 and concluded that the provision was intended to afford greater privacy
protection than the United States Constitution.2 96 The HRC argued that there was no infringement of a privacy right, because
there was no statutory privilege, and because employees and appli291. The protective order could not be overly restrictive, however. The court held that
"[a]ny party to the rate-making process shall have access to the trade secret information"
for use in the "ratemaking determination" and that "[flurther dissemination of the information we leave to the discretion of the PSC, to be released, or not released, in the exercise by
the PSC of its ratemaking functions." Id. at -,
634 P.2d at 189.
292. Id.
293. 199 Mont. 434, 649 P.2d 1283 (1982).
294. Id. at 437, 649 P.2d at 1285.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 440, 649 P.2d at 1286.
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cants had voluntarily submitted the information to a third party
and, therefore, had no legitimate expectation of privacy in that information.2 9 7 The court rejected that argument, finding that many
of the personnel files probably contained sensitive information,
which employees would reasonably expect to be kept
confidential.2 98
Notwithstanding its finding of individual privacy interests, the
court found that the HRC had a right to examine the files.2 9 Noting that '[t]he right of individual privacy must yield to a compelling state interest,' the court held that the constitution's mandate
against discrimination provided the compelling state interest for
HRC's access to the files. s0
The court determined that, while the files should be made
available to HRC, there must be a careful balancing between the
right to privacy and the right of public access.30 1 Relying on Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph, the court concluded that
the proper balance would be achieved through a protective order
which allowed the HRC broad discovery, while "restricting the release of information which suggests the identity of employees
whose files may be used in investigating the alleged discriminatory
practices ....
297. Id. at 441, 649 P.2d at 1287. The HRC relied on the court's previous holding in
Hastetter v. Behan, 196 Mont. 280, 282-83, 639 P.2d 510, 512-13 (1982), that article II, § 10
of the MONT. CONST. protects only matters which can reasonably be considered private and
that a person had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her telephone records.
298. Montana Human Rights Division, 199 Mont. at 442, 649 P.2d at 1287. The court
also held that the employer had standing to raise the issue of privacy on behalf of its employees and applicants for employment because the employer risks the possibility of being
sued by those individuals for revealing private information. Id. at 443, 649 P.2d at 1288.
299. Id. at 446, 649 P.2d at 1289, 1290.
300. Id. at 445-46, 649 P.2d at 1288-89 (citations omitted). The city argued "that test
scores and other arguably sensitive material could be altered in such a way that the names
of the employees would not be disclosed to the HRC, making "the intrusion ...less objectionable." The court rejected that argument, relying on the HRC's position that "many
names are indicators of national origin, sex and marital status." Id.
301. Id. at 448, 699 P.2d at 1290.
302. Id. at 448-449, 649 P.2d at 1291. In another case, Missoulian v. Board of Regents,
207 Mont. 513, 675 P.2d 962 (1984), the court held that job performance evaluations of the
state university presidents, which elicit candid and subjective comments from regents, anonymous interviewees, and the presidents themselves, are matters of individual privacy protected by the Montana Constitution and that such privacy expectations reasonably and
clearly exceeded the public's constitutional and statutory right to know. In balancing the
competing interests, the court found "The Board, the Commissioner [of Higher Education]
and the [university] presidents all rely on confidential evaluations to ...improve job performance." Id. at 531, 675 P.2d at 972. The court relied on testimony "that public disclosure
would inhibit candid evaluations from faculty, staff, and other interviewees, discourage presidents from making candid self-evaluations, and would damage the presidents' ability to
govern." Id. The court further relied on the district court's finding "that frank, honest and
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Agency Records and the Public's Right to Know

An important case dealing with public agency documents is
Belth v. Bennett.30 3 Belth, an Indiana resident and editor of a
monthly publication called "The Insurance Forum," requested of
Andrea Bennett, Montana Insurance Commissioner, certain information her office had received from the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).3 0" NAIC had developed the Insurance Regulatory Information System to assist in regulating insurance companies throughout the nation and the information was
used by the various state insurance commissioners to review the
financial affairs of insurance companies. 30 5 Because the NAIC furnished the material to state participants on a confidential basis,
the state argued that Montana would not be allowed to participate
in the information system if Commissioner Bennett had to divulge
the NAIC reports.30
The Montana Supreme Court reversed the decision of District
Judge Gordon R. Bennett, who held that Belth was entitled to the
information under the right to know provision.3 0 7 The supreme
court first held that a corporation may assert the right to privacy
exception to the right to know provision, relying on Mountain
States Telephone & Telegraph Co. 308 It next held that a governmental agency may assert a privacy interest of another (in this
case the NAIC), relying on Montana Human Rights Division. °9
The court then turned to an interpretation of a code provision,
which Commissioner Bennett claimed gave her the right to withhold the information.3 10 To avoid the constitutional problem, the
critical evaluations would not occur without confidentiality." Id. The court further observed
that "[t]he privacy interests of the presidents would suffer greatly from disclosure" as would
"the privacy of faculty, staff and other interviewees" who had participated in the evaluations. Id. at 532, 675 P.2d at 972. The court rejected the Missoulian's arguments that "public disclosure would further the public interest" in "fostering public confidence in public
institutions, maintaining the accountability of public officials, assuring public access to information to allow evaluation of public expenditures and preventing the secret conduct of
government." Id. The court said, "[tihe Missoulian has shown no relationship between the
information involved here and the objectives of the right to know provision." Id. The court
further held there were no satisfactory alternative methods available to protect the individual privacy involved. Id. at 535, 675 P.2d at 974.
303. 227 Mont. 341, 740 P.2d 638 (1987).
304. Id. at 343, 740 P.2d at 639-40.
305. Id. at 343, 740 P.2d at 639.
306. Id. at 343, 740 P.2d at 640.
307. Id. at 349, 740 P.2d at 643-44.
308. Id. at 345, 740 P.2d at 640-41.
309. Id. at 345, 740 P.2d at 641.
310. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-1-412(5) (1989) provides: "The commissioner may withhold from public inspection any examination or investigation report for so long as he deems
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court engaged in a narrow construction of the statute, holding that
the provision permitting the commissioner to withhold investigative reports from public inspection was "coextensive with" the
right to privacy exception found in article II, section 9.311 Thus,
the court held that the commissioner could invoke the statutory
exception only "when, in the words of Article II, § 9, 'the demand
of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public

disclosure.'

"312

The court then balanced the right to know against the right to
privacy."' As a preliminary matter, the court first used a two-part
test to determine whether a constitutionally protected privacy interest existed. Under that test, the court inquires 'whether the person involved had a subjective or actual expectation of privacy and
whether society is willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.' 1 4 Applying the test, the Belth court found that the nature of
the information was confidential and that release of the information would potentially jeopardize business reputations of companies."1 5 The court futher determined that the benefits of disclosure
were diminished by the availability of other, comparable information."'6 Balancing these concerns against the public right to know,
the court held that the rights of individual privacy substantially
outweighed the public's right to know.3 1 7 Justices Hunt and
Sheehy dissented, arguing: "It approaches inanity to hold that
Montana insureds shall not be allowed to know which troubled
companies are doing business in Montana or that they are troubled
companies."31a
such withholding to be necessary for the protection of the person examined against unwarranted injury or to be in the public interest."
311. Belth, 227 Mont. at 346, 740 P.2d at 641.
312. Id. at 346, 740 P.2d at 641.
313. Id. at 347, 740 P.2d at 642.
314. Id. (quoting Missoulian v. Board of Regents, 207 Mont. 513, 522, 675 P.2d 962,
967 (1984)).
315. Id. at 348, 740 P.2d at 643.
316. Id. at 348-49, 740 P.2d at 643.
317. Id. at 349, 740 P.2d at 643.
318. Id. at 350, 354, 740 P.2d at 644, 646 (Sheehy, J., and Hunt, J., dissenting). Justice
Hunt quoted Justice Sheehy's language with approval in his separate dissent. Id. at 350, 740
P.2d at 644 (Hunt, J., dissenting). See also Engrav v. Cragun, 236 Mont. 260, 769 P.2d 1224
(1989), in which the court weighed the public's right to know about county law enforcement
operations, as represented by the appellants' desire to do a school research project, against
the privacy interest of persons named in daily logs of telephone calls, case files of criminal
investigations, pre-employment investigation reports, and lists of persons arrested. The
court determined that those individuals whose names would be disclosed by release of the
information had an actual expectation of privacy which society recognized, and that this
privacy interest outweighed the appellant's right to do a study for a school research project.
Id. at __, 769 P.2d at 1227.
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The court more recently balanced the right to know against
the right to privacy in Allstate Insurance Co. v. City of Billings. 19
In that case, Allstate wanted to review the accident investigation
the police prepared concerning the death of Allstate's insured.2 °
Allstate suspected that the insured's death was a suicide and believed that the investigative records of the police might assist it in
determining whether the insured made misrepresentations in his
application for insurance that would render the application void.32 1
The Billings Police Department objected to the general release
of the records and requested protective orders.2 The district
court, however, denied Allstate's application, holding that Allstate
32 3
was not authorized under the Criminal Justice Information Act
to receive such information. _ The court interpreted the Act to
mean that one was not "authorized by law" to receive such information without specific statutory authorization.3 2 5 Allstate did not
qualify under this interpretation.
The supreme court reversed, finding that one is "'authorized
by law' to receive criminal justice information by the Right to
Know provision of the Constitution" and that the "only limitation
on the right is the constitutional right to privacy. "326 The court
further held that it is the duty of the judiciary to "balance the
competing rights at issue . . . to determine what, if any information, should be given" a requesting party.32 7 Allstate met its initial
burden of showing that it possessed the requisite interest in the
information.3 28 Therefore, the supreme court remanded the case to
the district court to conduct an in camera inspection, instructing
the court to balance the competing interests, while still permitting
Allstate "the widest breadth of information possible. 3 9 . Finally,
the court directed that "any release of information" could "be con33
ditioned upon limits contained within a protective order.
In a similar case, Great Falls Tribune Co. v. Cascade County
Sheriff,3 ' the Great Falls Tribune sought information from the lo319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Mont.
Id. at -,
Id. at -,
Id. at -,
See MONT.
Allstate, Id. at
Id. at -,
Id. at -,
Id. at -,
Id. at -,
Id. at -,
Mont.
-

-, 780 P.2d 186 (1989).
780 P.2d at 186.
780 P.2d at 187.
780 P.2d at 187.
CODE ANN. §§ 44-5-101-515 (1987).
Mont. -,
780 P.2d at 187.
780 P.2d at 188 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-5-305 (1987)).
780 P.2d at 188.
780 P.2d at 189.
780 P.2d at 189.
780 P.2d at 189.
780 P.2d at 189.
-, 775 P.2d 1267 (1989).
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cal police department regarding officers who had been fired or disciplined because of alleged police misconduct involving physical injuries to an apprehended suspect.3 32 The sheriff, police chief, and
the Great Falls city manager refused to disclose the names of the
disciplined officers, based on the officers' rights to privacy. 3 The
Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order directing that the information be provided to the Tribune, reasoning
'it is not good public policy to recognize an expectation of privacy
in protecting the identity of a law enforcement officer whose conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to merit discipline.' 334 Moreover,
the supreme court held that "the public has a right to know when
law enforcement officers act in such a manner as to be subject to
335
disciplinary action.
3. The Scope of the Right to Know Provision When No
Competing Individual Privacy Interest is Involved: The Right to
Attend Meetings of Governmental Agencies
The case with the most far-reaching implications regarding the
citizens' right to know is one which is presently on appeal to the
Montana Supreme Court from Lewis and Clark County, Associated Press v. Board of Public Education.3 6 In that case, District
Judge Sherlock decided the question of whether the litigation exception found in Montana's open meetings law 3 7 is constitutional
under article II, section 9 of the Montana Constitution.3 38
Article II, section 9 contains only one exception to the public's
right to observe deliberations of agencies of state government:
when the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits
of public disclosure. Despite this provision, Montana's open meeting law allowed public bodies to close meetings when discussing "a
strategy to be followed with respect to collective bargaining or liti332. Id. at
333. Id. at

-,
-,

775 P.2d at 1268.
755 P.2d at 1268.

334. Id. at

-,

755 P.2d at 1269 (quoting the order of the district court).

335. Id. at

-,

755 P.2d at 1269.

336. Associated Press v. Board of Pub. Educ., No. BDV-89-121 (Mont. 1st Judicial
Dist., Aug. 4, 1989) [hereinafter Assoc. Press].
337. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-203(4) (1989).
338. in Jarussi v. Board of Trustees, 204 Mont. 131, 664 P.2d 316 (1983), a non-tenured teacher brought an action against the school board for violating the open meeting law,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-203 (1981), and for wrongful termination of his employment. The
school board attempted to rely on the "collective bargaining exception" under the statute.
Jarussi, at 137, 664 P.2d at 319. The court rejected this argument, noting that there was no
explicit definition of "collective bargaining" under Montana law but finding that the meeting to discuss Jarussi's employment status did not fall within the collective bargaining exception. Id. at 139, 664 P.2d at 320.
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gation when an open meeting would have a detrimental effect on
the bargaining or litigating position of the public agency."3 39 Looking to the plain meaning of the constitution, Judge Sherlock, in an
extensive and scholarly opinion, invalidated those features of Montana's open meeting law.,"4 Judge Sherlock rejected the state's contention that a superseding right exists to conduct a closed meeting,
based on a client's privilege that the client's attorney not be compelled to testify concerning confidential communications between
attorney and client, and on the ethical imperative that an attorney
not reveal a client's secrets. 4 ' In rejecting that argument, Judge
Sherlock held that the open meeting provision does not require
government attorneys to violate the rules of professional conduct;
rather, "it merely restricts a public lawyer's capacity to deal with
34 2
his or her client when the public body is meeting as a body.
The more important reason for rejecting that argument was
that the considerations advanced by the state were merely "statutory" and could not outweigh the clear constitutional language of
article II, section 9.343 Judge Sherlock observed that "Montana's
right to know provision is truly unique among all the states' constitutions," ' and "is the strongest guarantee of the public's right to
know found in any state constitution in the Nation. ' 345 He thus
rejected the state's attempt to rely on decisions of other states,
which either were not constitutionally based or were based on constitutions markedly different from Montana's.3 4 Finally, Judge
339. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-203(4) (1989).
340. Rejecting the Board of Education's argument that the debates in the Constitutional Convention indicated an intent to except litigation and collective bargaining discussions, Judge Sherlock determined that the debates were, at best, ambiguous and stated:
The argument from intention is the long familiar Nixonian jurisprudential position that a constitutional intention, the "original intention" of the "framers" can
be divined and should influence the way in which judges interpret constitutional
provisions. Discovering everything that went on in the minds of each member of
the Convention, determining which mental states of individual delegates are relevant and how those pertaining should be combined into a group intention which
then becomes an historical fact, however, are impossible tasks. (Citing Dworkin,
The Forum of Principle,56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 467, 481 (1981)) ...In sum, the Court
concludes that no such intention lies waiting to be discovered. There is only one
waiting to be invented, a step this Court will not take.
Assoc. Press, supra note 336, slip. op. at 13-14.
341. Id. at 16.
342. Id. at 17.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 20.
345. Id. at 20. The constitutions of thirty-three states guarantee open sessions of the
legislature, twelve states have no open meeting or right to know statutes, and "only four
states have constitutions with broad open meetings [or] right to know provisions." Id. at 21.
346. Id. at 21.
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Sherlock rejected "the notion that [he] might find an otherwise unconstitutional statute" nevertheless valid on "policy grounds
7
34
alone. ,

He then turned to the defendant's argument that other important constitutional rights of the state outweighed the right to
know. He noted that the Board of Education had no individual
right to privacy at issue.34 8 In response to the Board of Public Edu-

cation's argument that its right to due process outweighed the
public's right to know, Judge Sherlock held that the state is not a
criminal defendant and "cannot invoke the due process
guaranty."349
In closing, Judge Sherlock wrote:
The Court takes very seriously the concern defendant expressed
at hearing about driving agency litigation strategy deliberations
"underground." The Court notes, however, that nothing prevents
the attorney from discussing litigation strategy in private with
members of the body singly, or in groups of less than a quorum. 50
Judge Sherlock made clear that he was not ruling on whether
the language in article II, section 9, providing that "[n]o person
shall be deprived of the right to examine documents," would include confidential memorandums discussing litigation strategy sent
by an attorney to his or her state agency client. 51
4. Conclusion
In sum, Montana has elevated the right of individual privacy
to a very high place in its constellation of constitutional values.
The right to observe deliberations of government also far exceeds
347. Id. at 21.
348. Id. at 21-22.
349. The Board of Education relied on State ex rel. Smith v. District Court, 201 Mont.
376, 654 P.2d 982 (1982), in which the court held that when press coverage would deny the
defendant a due process right, courts may close a pretrial hearing. Id. at 383, 654 P.2d at
986. The court balanced two basic sets of competing interests: the Montana constitution's
right to know provision coupled with the United States Constitution's first and fourteenth
amendment rights of public access to criminal trials, against a criminal defendant's sixth

and fourteenth amendment rights to a fair trial. Id. at 383-85, 654 P.2d at 986-87.
350. Assoc. Press, supra note 336, slip op. at 31.
351. Id. at 31. As noted, this case is on appeal to the Montana Supreme Court. The
opening brief of the Board of Public Education, dated March 19, 1990, raised the following
issues:
1. Is the attorney-client privilege inherent in the right to counsel?
2. Does the public have a due process right to counsel when it is a party to pending or impending litigation? and
3. Does the public's right to counsel outweigh the public's right to know under the
facts of this case?
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similar federal protections, which are at best implied under the
federal constitution or provided through statute under the federal
Freedom of Information Acts5 2 with its many loopholes. The Montana Supreme Court has been vigilant in its appreciation and implementation of the paramount rights of privacy and right to
know, but has faced vexing conflicts in attempting to reconcile the
two provisions. In the search and seizure arena, however, an area
in which there is a substantial body of established federal law,
Montana's separate right to privacy has been only of marginal application in protecting the privacy of Montanans at a level higher
than the federal fourth amendment protections, and in recent decision the court has compromised the extra protection afforded by
Montana's explicit privacy clause.
IV. THE STRUCTURAL PROVISIONS OF THE MONTANA

A.

CONSTITUTION

Education and Public Lands

1. Education
Article X of the Montana Constitution governs both education
and public lands. From the standpoint of education, the most significant provision is section 1 which sets forth educational goals
and duties. That section reads as follows:
(1) It is the goal of the people to establish a system of education
which will develop the full educational potential of each person.
Equality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person
of the state.
(2) The state recognizes the distinct and unique cultural heritage
of the American Indians and is committed in its educational goals
to the preservation of their cultural integrity.
(3) The legislature shall provide a basic system of free quality
public elementary and secondary schools. The legislature may
provide such other educational institutions, public libraries, and
educational programs as it deems desirable. It shall fund and distribute in an equitable manner to the school districts the state's
share of the cost of the basic elementary and secondary school
system.

The most significant decision of the Montana Supreme Court
construing this provision is Helena Elementary School District
No. 1 v. State358 (the school funding case). In that case, the Montana Supreme court construed the second sentence of article X,
352.
353.

5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1989).
236 Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 684 (1989).
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section 1(1), which guarantees "equality of educational opportunity . . . to each person of the state," to invalidate the funding
system in the state of Montana. 54
The state employed two provisions of article X in an attempt
to avoid the equalization feature of section 1(1). The first provision, section 1(3), states that "[tihe legislature shall provide a basic
system of free quality public elementary and secondary schools"
and "shall fund and distribute in an equitable manner . . . the
state's share of the cost of the basic elementary and secondary
school system." The state argued that the constitution required it
to fund only a "basic system" of public education, that the framers
of the 1972 Constitution contemplated reliance on local sources of
revenue for partial funding of education, and that any inequalities
in local sources of revenue were justified by the language in subsection 3.355 In essence, the argument was that the state was obligated
to equalize only the "basic education," and inequities beyond that
level were excused. Both the district court and supreme court in
Helena Elementary School District rejected this argument. The
Montana Supreme Court stated:
There is nothing [in] the plain wording of subsection (3) to suggest that the clear statement of the obligations on the part of the
Legislative in some manner was intended to be a limitation on the
guarantee of equal educational opportunity contained in subsection (1). The guarantee provision of subsection (1) is not limited
to any one branch of government. Clearly the guarantee of equal
educational opportunity is binding upon all three branches of
government, the legislative as well as the executive and judicial
branches.... We hold that the last sentence of subsection (3) is
not a limiting provision on the guarantee of equal educational opportunity contained in subsection (1).'"
The state also attempted to argue that "local control" is constitutionally mandated under article X, section 8. That section
provides: "The supervision and control of schools in each school
district shall be vested in a board of trustees to be elected as provided by law." The state asserted that inherent in local control, is
the prerogative to pass local levies and to make financing decisions
locally, even if that results in financial inequality. 57 This justification had been relied upon, in part, by the United States Supreme
Court in a case involving a similar challenge to a school funding
354.
355.
356.
357.

Id. at 52, 769 P.2d at 690.
Id. at 53, 769 P.2d at 689-90.
Id.
Id. at 54, 769 P.2d at 690.
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system, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.35 8
In contrast to the state, the plaintiffs argued that, while local
control of schools is a legitimate interest, some state regulation of
educational policy is inevitable. The plaintiffs noted that the Montana Supreme Court had explicitly recognized in School District
No. 12 v. Hughes3 59 that local control of schools is not absolute. In
that case the court observed: "There is no doubt the local boards
of trustees are subject to legislative control and do not have control over the local schools to the exclusion of other governmental
entities." 360 After reviewing the debates of the 1972 Constitutional
Convention relating to article X, section 8, the Hughes court concluded: "From a reading of the Convention transcripts, it is clear
the delegates contemplated only a preservation of the powers of
the local boards of trustees, not an expansion of those powers."3'61
The court in Helena Elementary School District rejected the
state's local control argument, finding that article X, section 8 did
not excuse the type of spending disparities evident in the record,
stating, "In fact, as the District Court correctly found, the present
system of funding may be said to deny the poorer school districts a
significant level of local control, because they have fewer options
362
due to fewer resources.
Beyond these cases and the Bartmess case, there has been little significant constitutional litigation on the education aspect of
article X, although the remedial contours of Helena Elementary
School District remain to be shaped and promise to provide further guidance on the meaning of article X.
2. Public Lands
Article X, section 4 establishes the Board of Land Commissioners, consisting of the governor, superintendent of public instruction, state auditor, secretary of state, and attorney general.
The Board has the authority to direct the leasing and sale of
school trust lands. Section 11 of article X deals with dispositions of
public land trusts.
In 1979, in Jerke v. State Department of Lands,3 6 1 the Montana Supreme Court addressed the question of how far the state
358. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
359. 170 Mont. 267, 552 P.2d at 328 (1976).
360. Id. at 276, 552 P.2d at 333.
361. Id. at 272, 552 P.2d at 331 (citing VIII TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 100, at 58-59);
see also Yanzick v. School Dist. No. 23, 196 Mont. 375, 641 P.2d 431 (1982).
362. Helena Elementary School Dist., 236 Mont. at 54, 769 P.2d at 690.
363. 182 Mont. 294, 597 P.2d 49 (1979).
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could surrender its managerial prerogatives over school lands without violating the trust imposed by the Enabling Act.36 ' Montana
law empowered grazing districts to manage and allocate lands
within their jurisdiction, 3 5 including the power to grant preference
rights to members in the re-leasing of school lands within the district. 366 The plaintiff in Jerke contended that the preference right
unconstitutionally prevented the state from receiving full market
value for the land.3 61 Because the existing lessee exercising a preference right was not using the land, and thus not "follow[ing] good
agricultural practices and mak[ing] improvements on the land,"36' 8
the court held that the preference right was unconstitutional as
applied. The court stated:
To allow the preference right to be exercised in this or that case
would be to install the Grazing District as the trustee of the land.
It, rather than the Department of State Lands, would decide who
will occupy the land but it would not be bound by a constitu36 9
tional or fiduciary duty.
Jerke was followed by Department of State Lands v. Pettibone370 in 1985. The issue in Pettibone was whether, under the
Montana Water Adjudication System, 37 1 the lessee of state lands
held title to water rights that had been developed through use on
state public lands or whether such title vests in the state. The
court set out three important principles governing school trust
lands:
1) that the enabling acts created trusts similar to a private charitable trust which the state could not abridge; 2) that the enabling
acts were to be strictly construed according to fiduciary principles, and; 3) that the enabling acts preempt state laws or
72
3

constitutions.

The court then held:
[T]itle to these water rights vests in the State. The lessee, in
making appropriations on and for school trust sections, is acting
364. The Enabling Act of 1889 added certain federal lands to Montana for the purpose
of supporting the common schools. Act of Feb. 22, 1889 ch. 180, 25 Stat. 679-681. Under
that act, there are certain trust obligations by which the state must manage the state public
lands. See Department of State Lands v. Pettibone, 216 Mont. 361, 702 P.2d 948 (1985).
365. MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-16-306 (1979).
366. MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-6-205(1) (1979).
367. Jerke, 182 Mont. at 296, 597 P.2d at 50.
368. Id. at 297, 597 P.2d at 51.
369. Id.
370. 216 Mont. 361, 702 P.2d 948 (1985).
371. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-211 to -243 (1985).
372. Pettibone, 216 Mont. at 369, 702 P.2d at 953 (citations omitted).
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on behalf of the State. . . The lessee, under the terms of the
lease, is simply entitled to the use of water appurtenant to the
school trust land. The State is the beneficial user of the water,
and its duty as trustee of the school trust lands prohibits it from
alienating any interest in the land, such as the appurtenant
water
373
right, without receiving full compensation therefore.
An important case currently pending in Lewis and Clark
County, Montana Coalition for Appropriate Management, Inc. v.
Department of State Lands,7 4 challenges the State Land Board
and the Department of State Lands for failing to implement multiple-use management on state public lands and for precluding public recreational use on those lands. Montana Code Annotated, section 77-1-203(1), directs that the management of state public lands
be on a multiple-use basis. The state, however, with minor exceptions, historically has not employed multiple use for lands devoted
to grazing and agricultural purposes, asserting that it is obligated
to achieve optimal monetary compensation to the trust. The suit
raises the issues of whether this one-dimensional management is
proper and whether the defendants have legitimately sought avenues of compensation for public recreational and multiple uses.
Much of plaintiff's theory in that case hinges on article X, section 11. The predecessor to that section, article XVII, section 1 of
the 1889 Constitution, provided for a rigid four-part classification
of state public lands consisting of grazing, timber,.agricultural, and
municipal lands. Article X, section 11(4) changed that management mandate providing as follows: "All public land shall be classified by the board of land commissioners in a manner provided by
law. Any public land may be exchanged for other land, public or
private, which is equal in value and, as closely as possible, equal in
area." The constitutional convention debates indicate the change
was made to accommodate multiple-use purposes. 5 Recently, Dis373. Id. at 368, 702 P.2d at 952 (emphasis in original).
374. No. ADV-88-144 (Mont. 1st Judicial Dist., filed Feb. 24, 1988) [hereinafter Montana Coalition for Appropriate Management].
375. In addressing this change at the Constitutional Convention, Delegate Davis said:
The 1971 Legislature passed, by House Joint Resolution 32, for the Constitutional
Convention to amend [the constitution] to permit classification other than the
four classifications that were in the original Constitution; and the main idea of
this was so we could have classification for multiple-use purposes-and multiple-use, of course, will answer a lot of questions that have been in the minds of,
maybe not you folks, but the public, as to why more recreationaluse cannot be
made of these lands. They have been constitutionally classified under agricultural,
grazing, and so forth, but there was no other classification, and so we have deleted
that to leave it statutory, and this was met with the unanimous approval of both
the Natural Resources Committee and the Education and Public Lands Commit-
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trict Judge Sherlock issued an order denying the motion for summary judgment of the Department of State Lands, stating:
Plaintiff does not point to any constitutional language which explicitly requires that state lands be managed on a multiple use
basis. Article X, Section 11(4) delegates the task to the legislature. The convention transcript language cited seems to support,
though, that this was the overriding intent of the delgates. At any
rate, the legislature has enacted the multiple use statute, which is
law enough. Whether this is a hybrid of constitutional or statutory law seems to be a distinction without a difference, at least so
far as it appears [in] the present case. The Constitution gives the
Legislature the discretion to pass a multiple-use statute, and the
Legislature did so. Failure to follow the statute would seem to
conflict with the Legislature's contitutional grant of authority to
enact such a law, which was somewhat foreshadowed by the delegates ..

376

This case promises to offer a major opportunity for judicial guidance in the manner in which state public lands will be managed
well into the future.3 "
B.

The Environment and Natural Resources

The 1972 Montana Constitution contains a number of important environmental and natural resource provisions. It guarantees
a clean and healthful environment to each individual,3 7 directs the
government to provide for a clean and healthful environment,3 79
provides for reclamation of lands, 380 and establishes several principles governing water rights.3 8 1 These provisions of the 1972 Constitution have no counterpart in the predecessor 1889 Constitution or
the United States Constitution. The provisions pertaining to the
environment and to water rights are dealt with separately below.
tee and should, then, permit the State Land Department to go ahead and classify
these lands as to what natural resource benefits they should have. So, we merely
deleted the classification restrictions and left it, then, to the Legislature.
VI TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 100, at 2143-2144 (emphasis added).
376. Opinion and Order, June 19, 1990 at 37, Montana Coalition for Appropriate
Management, supra note 374.
377. The trial of the case has recently been postponed until the spring of 1991 in
response to recent hearings held by the Board of Land Commissioners which may result in
administrative modification of the state's policy. Order, June 14, 1990, Montana Coalition
for Appropriate Management, supra note 374.
378. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
379. MONT. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
380. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
381. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
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1. The Environment
The 1972 Montana Constitution contains two provisions mandating a clean and healthful environment. The first of these is
found in the Declaration of Rights and reads as follows: "All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They include the right to a clean and healthful environment ... 382
The second provision is found in article IX, section 1 and contains the most important environmental guarantee of that article. 83 That section declares:
(1) The state and each person shall maintain and improve a clean
and healthful environment in Montana for present and future
generations.
(2) The legislature shall provide for the administration and enforcement of this duty.
(3) The legislature shall provide adequate remedies for the protection of the environmental life support system from degradation and provide adequate remedies to prevent unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural resources.
There has been little significant case law interpreting these
provisions. Ironically, perhaps the most significant decision was

Montana Wilderness Association v. Board of Health (Wilderness
Association D,384 a decision which was later withdrawn. 8 As
Daniel Kemmis pointed out, the work of implementing the constitution's environmental provisions "began on a healthy tenor in
1976," when the Montana Supreme Court decided Wilderness Association 1.38 6 Kemmis observed:
In a thoughtful opinion by Justice Haswell, the court came as
near as any court in the nation to giving a constitutional guarantee of environmental rights the respect and the weight which its
constitutional status requires. The decision was withdrawn upon
rehearing of the case, and therefore it is not precedent for future
Montana decisions. Because the second decision avoided the constitutional question, the withdrawn opinion may still supply some
indication of how the court will treat the environmental provisions in a future case in which a constitutional question is
382. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
383. See Kemmis, The Montana Constitution: Taking New Rights Seriously-I. Environmental Rights, 39 MONT, L. REV. 224 (1978) [hereinafter Kemmis].
384. This decision was never officially printed; however, Justice Haswell set forth the
entire opinion in his dissent to Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Health (Wilderness
Ass'n II), 171 Mont. 477, 487, 559 P.2d 1157, 1168 (1976) (Haswell, J., dissenting).
385. Wilderness Ass'n , 171 Mont. 477, 559 P.2d 1157 (1976).
386. Kernmis, supra note 383, at 224.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol51/iss2/8

58

Goetz: Interpretations of the Montana Constitution: Sometimes Socratic, Sometimes Erratic

1990]

INTERPRETATION

addressed.38 7
One of the central questions in Wilderness Association I was
whether the plaintiff environmental organization and its individual
members had standing to challenge the actions of state governments that affected the environment. The Wilderness Association
I decision relied on the environmental provisions of the Montana
Constitution to support such standing.38 8 The plaintiff alleged that
the Department of Health and Environmental Sciences had filed
an inadequate environmental impact statement under the Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA).38 9 Noting that this case
was one of first impression on standing under MEPA, the court
reviewed standing requirements in Montana case law and also reviewed the significant federal case law on standing of environmental groups.39 0 The court recognized that under federal law, a person
whose aesthetic or recreational interests were injured by federal
agency action had standing to sue in federal court."' Instead of
relying completely upon the federal development of standing under
a statutory umbrella, however, the court found standing justified
by the Montana Constitution:
First, the complaint alleges a threatened injury to a civil right of
the Association's members, that is, the "inalienable ... right to a
clean and healthful environment." This constitutional provision,
enacted in recognition of the fact that Montana citizens' right to
a clean and healthful environment is on a parity with more traditional inalienable rights, certainly places the issue of unlawful en32
vironmental degradation within the judicial cognizance.
As noted, the Haswell opinion is not binding on future cases
because it was withdrawn. However, the first opinion may give
some guidance in the future on citizen standing to vindicate important constitutional environmental interests. The second decision
ignored the standing issue and did not address the environmental
387. Id. at 224-25.
388. Wilderness Ass'n I, 171 Mont. at 498, 559 P.2d at 1168 (Haswell, J., dissenting).
The Montana Court has generally been receptive to affording liberal standing to citizens
and citizens' groups to raise judicial issues. See Grossman v. State Dep't of Natural Resources, 209 Mont. 427, 682 P.2d 1319 (1984).
389. Wilderness Ass'n 1, 171 Mont. at 500, 559 P.2d at 1169 (Haswell, J., dissenting).
The Montana Environmental Policy Act is currently codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-1101 to -324 (1989).
390. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(S.C.R.A.P.), 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
391. Wilderness Ass'n I, 177 Mont. at 492, 559 P.2d at 1164-65 (Haswell, J.,
dissenting).
392. Id. at 497-98, 559 P.2d at 1167 (Haswell, J., dissenting) (quoting MONT. CONST.
art. II, § 3).
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provisions of Montana's constitution. Instead, it simply reversed
the district court on its interpretation of the interaction between
the Montana Environmental Policy Act and the Montana Subdivi393
sion and Platting Act.
The other major case dealing with the environmental provisions of the constitution is Kadillak v. Anaconda Co. 394 There, the
court upheld the decision of the Montana Department of State
Lands that no environmental impact statement need be prepared
pursuant to MEPA for the proposed dumping of overburden and
other wastes by the Anaconda Company. 95 The court specifically
relied on a conflict between MEPA and the Montana Hardrock
Mining Act (HRMA)3 96 HRMA required the Department to act
within 60 days upon receipt of a complete application for permit."9 7 The court noted that a full environmental impact statement
could not possibly be prepared within that 60-day period." Relying on Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Association,39 9 a federal case interpreting the National Environmental
Policy Act, the court held that the environmental impact state40 0
ment requirement was inapplicable.
The appellants urged the court not to follow the federal precedent because of the Montana Constitution's strong mandate to
protect the environment in article II, section 3 and in article IX,
sections 1 and 2. The court declined, stating:
[T]his argument, however, does not have sufficient merit to compel this Court to abandon the rationale of Flint Ridge. Both the
MEPA and the HRMA predate the new constitution. There is no
indication that the MEPA was enacted to implement the new
constitutional guarantee of a "clean and healthful environment."
This Court finds that the statutory requirement of an EIS is not
given constitutional status by the subsequent enactment of this
constitutional guarantee. If the legislature had intended to give
an EIS constitutional status they could have done so after 1972.
It is not the function of this Court to insert into a statute "what
4 01
has been omitted.
393. Montana Wilderness Ass'n H, 171 Mont. at 484-85, 559 P,2d at 1161.
394. 184 Mont. 127, 602 P.2d 147 (1979).
395. Id. at 138, 602 P.2d at 154.
396. Id.
397. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 82-4-301 to -362 (1989).
398. Kadillak, 184 Mont. at 134, 602 P.2d at 152.
399. 426 U.S. 776 (1976).
400. Kadillak, 184 Mont. at 138, 602 P.2d at 154.
401. Id. In a case of less significance, State v. Bernhard, 173 Mont. 464, 568 P.2d 136
(1977), the Montana Supreme Court held that the "clean and healthful" language in article
II, section 3 could sustain an exercise of the police power to preserve aesthetic values. Id. at
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Other than these provisions, little has been made by the courts
thus far of Montana's constitutional environmental features.
2.

Water Rights

In 1984, the Montana Supreme Court decided two important
stream access cases.40 2 These decisions were based, in part, on article IX, section 3(3) of the Montana Constitution which provides:
"All surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric waters within
the boundaries of the state are the property of the state for the use
of its people and are subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as
provided by law."
In Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran,403 the riparian landowner argued that he owned the banks and the bed underlying the Dearborn River and had the right to bar floaters from
the use of the stretch of the Dearborn River running through his
property.0 4 The evidence established that the Dearborn River had
been used for commercial purposes at the time of Montana statehood and the court held that such commercial use met the navigability-in-fact test for title purposes under federal law. 40 5 As a consequence, the title to the streambed passed to the state at the time
of statehood under the "equal-footing doctrine ' 406 and the land4 07
owner did not have title to the streambed.
The court, however, went beyond the title question and examined the question of whether recreational use and fishing make
a stream navigable. The court held that "[n]avigability for use is a
matter governed by state law."'4 08 The court recognized the importance of the public trust doctrine, as initially defined by the
United States Supreme Court in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois.4 9 Applying both the public trust doctrine and article IX, sec468, 568 P.2d at 138.
402. Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, 210 Mont. 38, 682 P.2d 163
(1984); Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth, 211 Mont. 29, 684 P.2d 1088
(1984).
403. 210 Mont. 38, 682 P.2d 163 (1984).
404. Id., at 42, 682 P.2d at 165.
405. Id. at 43, 682 P.2d at 166 (citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870)).
406. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
407. Curran, 210 Mont. at 44, 682 P.2d at 166.
408. Id. at 51, 682 P.2d at 170.
409. Id. at 47-48, 682 P.2d at 167-68 (quoting Illinois Central R.R., 146 U.S. 387, 45253 (1892)). The court emphasized the following language from the Illinois Central R.R. case:
The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave
them entirely under the use and control of private parties, except in the instance of parcels mentioned for the improvement of the navigation and use of
the waters, or when parcels can be disposed of without impairment of the public
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tion 3 of the Montana Constitution, the court said:
In essence, the question is whether the waters owned by the State
under the Constitution are susceptible to recreational use by the
public. The capability of use of the waters for recreational purposes determines their availability for recreational use by the
public. Streambed ownership by a private party is irrelevant. If
the waters are owned by the State and held in trust for the people
by the State, no private party may bar the use of those waters by
the people. The Constitution and the public trust doctrine do not
permit a private party to interfere with the public's right to recreational use of the surface of the State's waters.""
Several months later, the court affirmed that position in Mon-

tana Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth, 11 a case dealing
with the Beaverhead River. The essential difference between Hildreth and Curran is that the district court found no evidence of
commercial use of the Beaverhead at the time of Montana's statehood, but instead applied a straight recreational-use test in finding
the Beaverhead accessible to the public for recreational purposes.
The Hildreth court, following Curran, affirmed the lower court,
holding that "the question of title to the underlying streambed is
immaterial in determining navigability for recreational use of
State-owned waters. 41 2 The court rejected Hildreth's allegation of
a taking without due process finding that:
Navigability for recreational land use is limited, under the Montana Constitution, only by the capabilities of the waters themselves for such use. Hildreth has never owned and does not now
own the waters of the Beaverhead River. Under Montana law, the
public has the right to use the Beaverhead and its bed and banks
up to the ordinary high water mark, with additional, narrowly
limited rights to portage around barriers. 13
The stream access cases were followed by a fractious legislative session which eventually resulted in legislation seeking to clarify public rights to the use of Montana waters. 41 4 That legislation
was subsequently challenged in Galt v. Montana Department of
Fish, Wildlife & Parks."5 In addressing the constitutionality of the
interest in what remains, than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace.
Id. at 47-48, 682 P.2d at 168 (emphasis by the Montana Supreme Court).
410. Id., 210 Mont. at 52, 682 P.2d at 170.
411. 211 Mont. 29, 684 P.2d 1088 (1984).
412. Id. at 36, 684 P.2d at 1092.
413. Id. at 40, 684 P.2d at 1094.
414. That legislation is now codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-301 to -322 (1989).
415. 225 Mont. 142, 731 P.2d 912 (1987).
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statute, the court framed the issues as follows:
1) Whether the public trust doctrine relating to water includes
the use of adjoining land?
2) Whether Sections 23-2-301, et seq., MCA, permit uses of the
bed and banks and
adjoining land beyond the scope of the public
16
trust doctrine?"

The court, following Curran and Hildreth, held that "[tlhe public
has a right of use up to the high water mark, but only such use as
is necessary to utilization of the water itself. ...

any use of the bed

and banks must be of minimal impact."" 7 The court found certain
minor sections of the statute to be unconstitutional." 8
On balance, the Galt court's opinion substantially reaffirmed
the thrust of the Curran and Hildreth decisions, but trimmed in
minor ways the extent of the public's right of use. As the court
stated:
This [recreational use] easement must be narrowly confined so
that impact to beds and banks owned by private individuals is
minimal. Only that use which is necessary for the public to enjoy
its ownership of the water resource will be recognized as within
the easement's scope. The real property interests of private landowners are important as are the public's property interest in
water. Both are constitutionally protected. These competing interests, when in conflict, must be reconciled to the extent
possible.""

In 1985, the court decided another significant water rights decision, State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes.42 0 Article IX, section 3(4) of the Montana Constitution provides: "The legislature shall provide for the administration, con416.

Id. at 144, 731 P.2d at 913.

417.

Id. at 147, 731 P.2d at 915.

418. Id. at 148, 731 P.2d at 916. The court held that MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2302(2)(d)-(f) were unconstitutional. These sections allowed overnight camping, certain big
game hunting, and placement of permanent duck blinds. The court held:
Overnight camping is not always necessary for utilization of the water resource
itself. The public can float and fish many of our rivers without camping overnight.
The statute is overbroad in giving the public right to a recreational use which is
not necessary for the public's enjoyment of its water ownership. The same can be
said of constructing permanent objects between high water marks. Although duck
blinds may be necessary for enjoying the ownership interests in certain large bodies of water, the right to construct permanent improvements on any commercially
navigable stream does not follow.
Galt, 225 Mont. at 148, 731 P.2d at 916.
The court further struck down MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-311(3)(e) "insofar as it requires the
landowner to bear the cost of constructing a portage route around artificial barriers." Id.
419. Galt, 225 Mont. at 148, 731 P.2d at 96.
420. 219 Mont. 76, 712 P.2d 754 (1985).
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trol, and regulation of water rights and shall establish a system of
centralized records, in addition to the present system of local
records." After several unsuccessful starts, the Montana Legislature enacted Montana Code Annotated, section 85-2-212, which
called for a statewide adjudication of all water rights in Montana.
Under their various treaties, the Indian tribes in Montana hold aboriginal and federally "reserved" water rights. 21 The tribes, as sovereign nations, traditionally have been immune from state-court
jurisdiction. In 1952, however, Congress enacted the McCarran
Amendment, providing for concurrent state jurisdiction to adjudicate federal water rights in a general adjudication.4 2 2 Although the
McCarran Amendment did not expressly waive the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes, the United States Supreme Court held in
1976 that the McCarran Amendment applied to Indian water
rights.4 23
However, the act that enabled Montana and other states to be
admitted to statehood in 1889 required the prospective states to
hold constitutional conventions and declare:
That the people inhabiting said proposed states do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to ... all lands
...owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes . . .and that
...said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States ....124
Pursuant to this provision, the 1889 Montana Constitution, 2 5 as
well as article I of the 1972 Montana Constitution, established a
"compact with the United States" disclaiming state jurisdiction
26
over "all lands owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes.'
This ordinance was "irrevocable without the consent of the United
States and the people of ... Montana."'' 27 Various Indian tribes,
seeking to avoid litigation of their water rights, asserted that these
enabling provisions barred adjudication of their rights in state
28
courts notwithstanding the McCarran Amendment.
In 1983, in Arizona v.San Carlos Apache Tribe, 29 the United
States Supreme Court held that, as a matter of federal law, these
421.
422.
423.
424.
federated
425.

426.
427.
428.
429.

For a discussion of these rights see id. at 90-94, 712 P.2d at 762-65.
43 U.S.C. § 666 (1988).
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
The Enabling Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 677 (1889) (quoted in ConSalish & Kootenai Tribes, 219 Mont. at 83, 712 P.2d at 758).
MONT. CONST. of 1889, preamble.
MONT. CONST. art. I.
Id.
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 219 Mont. at 86, 712 P.2d at 760.
463 U.S. 545 (1983).
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enabling provisions were no barrier: "[W]hatever limitation the
Enabling Acts or federal policy may have originally placed on
state-court jurisdiction over Indian water rights, those limitations
were removed by the McCarran Amendment.""3" The Court did
not, however, rule upon whether the McCarran Amendment removed state limitations, such as Montana's constitutional disclaimer.4 31 San Carlos also did not decide the question of the adequacy of Montana's Water Use Act to adjudicate Indian water
rights.
In order to resolve the questions left open in San Carlos
Apache, State Attorney General Greely asked the Montana Supreme Court to assume original jurisdiction to determine two issues: 1) whether "Montana's Water Use Act [is] adequate to adjudicate federal and Indian reserved water rights," and 2) whether
"Article I of the Montana Constitution prohibit[s] the Water
Court from asserting jurisdiction over reserved water rights held in
trust by the United States for Indians and Indian tribes within the
State of Montana. ' 4 3 2 Based on State ex rel. McDonald v. District
Court,3 3 the Montana Supreme Court held that the disclaimer
provision did not bar Montana's Water Court from exercising jurisdiction over Indian-reserved water rights, reasoning that "the
'consent of the people of the state,' "as used in Ordinance I, Sec. 2
of the Montana Constitution (1889), did not require a constitutional amendment.'4'4 The court held that the enactment of legislation was sufficient to meet the requirement for "consent of the
35
people.'
Turning to the question of whether the Montana Water Use
Act was adequate to adjudicate Indian-reserved water rights, the
court carefully analyzed that Act to assess whether it could accommodate the special aspects of Indian water rights. The court noted
the many differences between the typical state-created private
water rights under the prior appropriation doctrine, and the aboriginal and reserved rights of the Indian tribes. 3 For example,
private rights under state law are created by appropriation for a
430. Id. at 564.
431. The Court said: "[T]o the extent that a claimed bar to state jurisdiction in these
cases is premised on the respective State Constitutions, that is a question of state law over
which the state courts have binding authority." Id. at 561.
432. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 219 Mont. at 81, 712 P.2d at 757.
433. 159 Mont. 156, 496 P.2d 78 (1972).
434. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 219 Mont. at 87, 712 P.2d at 760-61.
435. Id. at 87, 712 P.2d at 760 (quoting McDonald, 159 Mont. 156, 496 P.2d 78
(1972)).
436. Id. at 89-94, 712 P.2d at 762-65.
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beneficial use pursuant to state law. In contrast, "[flederal reserved water rights are created by the document that reserves the
land from the public domain.

4 37

Moreover, "aboriginal-Indian re-

served water rights exist from time immemorial and are merely
recognized by the document that reserves the Indian land." 38 The
court further noted that the "right to water reserved to preserve
tribal hunting and fishing rights is unusual in that it is non-consumptive. 4 39 Another difference between private water rights and
Indian water rights is that "Indian reserved water rights may include future uses."4 40 Analyzing these and other differences be-

tween the typical private water right, which the Montana water
adjudication statute primarily addresses, and Indian water rights,
the court then analyzed the Montana Water Use Act to see if it
was adequate on its face to accommodate Indian water rights. In so
doing, the court made clear that federal Indian law controls the
substantive decisions:
Appropriative rights are based on actual use. Appropriation for
beneficial use is governed by state law. Reserved water rights are
established by reference to the purposes of the reservation rather
than to actual, present use of the water. The basis for an Indian
reserved water right is the treaty, federal statute or executive order setting aside the reservation. Treaty interpretation and statutory construction are governed by federal Indian law.""1
The court found that the Montana statute was adequate on its
face to adjudicate such rights, observing:
We recognize that the Water Use Act of Montana does not explicitly state that the Water Court shall apply federal law in adjudicating Indian reserved rights. However, we conclude that is not
fatal to the adequacy of the Act on its face. We hold that state
courts are required
to follow federal law with regard to those
42
water rights.

As a consequence, the Montana water adjudication process is
proceeding. To date, there has been no formal adjudication of any
Indian water rights, largely because all tribes except the Blackfeet
have been in compact negotiations with the state, thereby staying
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 97, 712 P.2d at 767.
at 93, 712 P.2d 764.
at 93, 712 P.2d 765.
at 90, 712 P.2d 762. The court carefully analyzed the federal canons of con-

struction of Indian law and made it clear that these federal canons must be followed by the
Montana Water Court in adjudicating Indian water rights. Id. at 91, 712 P.2d at 763.
442. Id. at 95, 712 P.2d at 765-766.
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355

the adjudication process. " 3 One such compact has been consummated between the Fort Peck Tribes and the State of Montana. 4
Because water is so vital to the well-being of both Montana's
economic interests and its recreationists, it is safe to say that article IX, section 3 will continue to be of significant importance in
constitutional adjudication. Particularly in the area of water rights
adjudication and state-Indian jurisdictional issues, it is likely that
there will be additional significant litigation.
V.

CONCLUSION

Montana's 1972 Constitution is one of the most progressive
constitutions in the country. Its declaration of rights provides perhaps the most stringent bulwark for the protection of individual
liberties of any in the nation. Its structural provisions are likewise
progressive and they hold the promise of providing a fair and efficient means of structuring the operations of state government.
There is increasing appreciation of the importance of state constitutions in our ever-evolving federal system. Because of its unique
constitution, Montana has made an important contribution since
1972 in the field of constitutional jurisprudence. The document,
although tarnished by a few unreasonably restrictive decisions, remains as a bright shining charter for the fair and efficient governance of a free people. If we continue to have a judiciary with integrity, if we insist on principled decisions, and, most important, if we
maintain fidelity to the spirit of the framers who came together in
1972 to give us this system, the charter should stand us in good
stead for many years.

443.
444.

See MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-702 (1989).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-201 (1989).
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